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ABSTRACT: In the following discussion , 1 examine what constitutes the dialectical
strain in Pumarn's thought. As part of this examination, I consider Purnam' (I 98 I )
criticism of rhe fact/value dichotomy. I compare this criticism to Putnam's analysis
of the metaphysical realist's position, a position which has occupied Purnarn's think-
ing more than any other philosophical stance. I describe how Putnarn pursues a charge
of self-refutation against the metaphysical realist and against the proponent of a
fact/value dichotomy, a charge which assumes dialectical significance. So it is that the
self-refuting nature of these' positions is linked to their unintelligibility. My con-
clus ion relates Purnarn's dialectical project to his wider philosophical ambitions,
ambitions which are influenced in large part by Wittgensteinian considerations.
Keywords: Hilary Putnam, dialectic, self-refutation arguments, fact/value dichotomy,
metaphysical realism, rationality, uninrelligibility, reflective and explanatory prac-
tice, metaphysical standpoint.
CONTENTS
Introduction : delimiting Purnamian dialectic
I . The fact/value dichotomy
2. Metaphysical realism
Bibliography
Introduction: delimiting Putnamian dialectic
Since his 1978 publication Meaning and the Moral Sciences, Hilary Putnarn
has consistently expressed dissatisfaction with his former position of
metaphysical realism. This critical phase in Putnam's thinking, a phase
which has been ongoing for some twenty years, is essentially dependent on
a dialectical mode of inquiryl. In this way, Putnam has become increas-
ingly concerned with examining the structure of entire philosophical con-
troversies. As part of this examination, he is interested in how the thesis
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a n d c o u n t e r - t h e s i s o f p a r t i c u l a r p h i l o s o p h i c a l d i s p u t e s t e n d t o s h a r e s i m i l a r
p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s . H e i s a l s o i n t e r e s t e d i n h o w w e g o a b o u t r e f u t i n g p h i l o -
s o p h i c a l p o s i t i o n s a n d , i n p a r t i c u l a r , i n t h e t e r m s o f c r i t i c i s m t h a t w e u s e
i n s u c h r e f u t a t i o n s . S o i t i s t h a t P u r n a m s e t s o u t t o d e m o n s t r a t e t h e u n i n r e l -
l i g i b i l i t y , n o t t h e f a l s i t y , o f t h e m e t a p h y s i c a l r e a l i s t ' s c l a i m s ( T h e n o t i o n
o f u n i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y i s c e n t r a l t o t h e f o l l o w i n g d i s c u s s i o n . A p r o p o s i t i o n ,
s t a t e m e n t o r t h e o r e t i c a l c l a i m i s u n i n t e l l i g i b l e w h e n t h e a c o n c e p t u a l p e r -
s p e c t i v e o f a m e t a p h y s i c a l s t a n d p o i n t i s p r e s u p p o s e d b y t h a t p r o p o s i t i o n ,
e t c . F r o m w i t h i n t h i s s t a n d p o i n t w e l a c k t h e c o n c e p t s t h a t a r e r e q u i r e d i n
o r d e r t o c o n f e r s e n s e u p o n ( h e n c e , t h e u n i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y o f ) s u c h p r o p o s i -
t i o n s , e t c . )
T h i s ' d i a l e c t i c a l t u r n ' h a s r e s u l t e d i n t h e r e j e c t i o n o f m a n y o f P u t n a m ' s
o w n p r o p o s a l s - f u n c t i o n a l i s m i s a c a s e i n p o i n t - a n d h a s r e v e a l e d y e t o t h e r
p h i l o s o p h i c a l p o s i t i o n s t o b e i n c o h e r e n t , p o s i t i o n s t o w h i c h p r e c r i t i c a l
P u r n a m w a s h i m s e l f c o m m i t t e d . Y e t i t w o u l d b e a m i s t a k e t o d e s c r i b e
t h i s d i a l e c t i c a l m e t h o d s o l e l y i n t e r m s o f i t s m o s t r e a d i l y a p p a r e n t f e a -
t u r e , t h a t o f t h e c r i t i c i s m o f t h e s e v a r i o u s p h i l o s o p h i c a l p o s i t i o n s . T o a p -
p r e c i a t e t h e m i s t a k e n n a t u r e o f s u c h a d e s c r i p t i o n , i t w i l l b e n e c e s s a r y t o
c i r c u m s c r i b e t h e d o m a i n o f P u t n a r n ' s d i a l e c t i c . I n d o i n g s o , I w i l l b e r e -
c o n s t r u c t i n g t h e d e t a i l s o f a m e t h o d w h i c h h a s u n t i l r e c e n t l y r e m a i n e d
l a r g e l y i m p l i c i t i n P u t n a r n ' s p h i l o s o p h y .
I d e s c r i b e d a b o v e h o w P u t n a m ' s d i a l e c t i c a l m e t h o d i s i n p a r t a c r i t i -
c i s m o f p h i l o s o p h i c a l t h e o r i e s . M o r e o v e r , P u t n a r n ' s c h a l l e n g e t o p h i l o -
s o p h i c a l t h e o r i e s c o m e s f r o m o n e w h o w i s h e s t o r e m a i n u n c o m m i t t e d ( f o r
g o o d r e a s o n s , a s w e s h a l l s e e ) t o b o t h t h e t h e s i s a n d c o u n t e r - t h e s i s o f a p a r -
t i c u l a r d i s p u t e . A t t h e s a m e t i m e , h o w e v e r , t h e t y p e o f d i a l e c t i c a l i n q u i r y
t h a t P u r n a m p u r s u e s m o v e s b e y o n d t h i s c r i t i c i s m o f t h e o r i e s i n a n u m b e r o f
w a y s . F i r s t l y , i t e x p o s e s i l l u s i o n s o f t h o u g h t t o w h i c h w e a r e s u b j e c t , i l l u -
s i o n s w h i c h a r i s e w h e n w e m i s t a k e n l y b e l i e v e t h a t w e h a v e g i v e n a s e n s e t o
t h e w o r d s u s e d t o f r a m e p h i l o s o p h i c a l ' p r o b l e m s ' . I n t h i s w a y , P u t n a m i s
c o n c e r n e d t o c h a l l e n g e t h e i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y o f t h e m e t a p h y s i c a l r e a l i s t ' s
c l a i m s , c l a i m s w h i c h a c h i e v e a m e t a p h y s i c a l i n f l a t i o n o f p l a t i t u d e s s u c h a s
' l a n g u a g e r e p r e s e n t s t h e e x t e r n a l w o r l d ' . T h i s c h a l l e n g e p r o c e e d s o n t h e b a -
s i s t h a t n o n o n - m e t a p h y s i c a l s e n s e h a s b e e n g i v e n t o t h e w o r d s ' l a n g u a g e ' ,
, ' d ' I d '
r e p r e s e n t s a n w o r .
A s i m i l a r p u r p o s e u n d e r l i e s t h e p r o c e d u r e o f W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s p h i l o s o p h y .
W i t t g e n s t e i n i s s t a n d a r d l y c r e d i t e d w i t h w h a t J a a k k o H i n t i k k a h a s c a l l e d
a v i e w o f l a n g u a g e a s t h e u n i v e r s a l m e d i u m ( H i n t i k k a ' s ' l a n g u a g e a s t h e
u n i v e r s a l m e d i u m ' a n d ' l a n g u a g e a s c a l c u l u s ' d i s t i n c t i o n i s a d e v e l o p m e n t
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of an earlier distinction in the work of Jean van Heijenoort between 'logic
as language' and 'logic as calculus'). As Hintikka portrays this view, it ap-
pears to have similarities to the conception of language that is central to
Purnarn's dialectical method, a conception which disavows the attempt to
discuss issues such as the reference of language to the world from within the
aconceptual perspective of a metaphysical standpoint:
(00 ') one cannot as it were look at one's langu age from outside and describe it , as one
can do to other objects that can be specified , referred to, described, discuss ed, and
theo rized abour in language. The reason for this alleged impossibiliry is that one
can use langu age ro talk about something only if one can rely on a given d efinir e
interpretation , a given network of meaning relations obtaining berween lan guage
and the world . Hence one cannot meaningfull y and sign ifican tly say in language
what these meaning relar ions are, for in any attempr ro do so one must already pre -
suppose them (Hintikka and Hintikka 1986, pp. 1-2).
The ineffability of semantics which derives from the con ception of lan-
guage as the universal medium ("the gist of this view of language as the uni-
versal medium lies in the thesis of the ineffability of semantics" (I 986, p. 2;
emphasis in original)) is taken by Hintikka and others to be th e motivation
for the say/show distinction which is standardly attributed to W ittgen-
stein:
The [irsr main thes is of th is chapter is rhar Wittgenstein 's att itude to the ineffa -
bility of sem antics was rather like Frege's. Wittgenstein had , in both his early and
his lare philo sophy, a clear and sweeping vision of how langu age and the world ar e
connected wirh each other. Like Frege, he did nor think that this vision could be
expr essed in language. Unlike Frcge, the you ng Wittgenstein nevertheless bel ieved
that he could convey his vision by an oblique use of language. This nonlircral , sec-
ondary employment of language he had to con sid er as some thing differen t from
saying what the sem antics of our lan guage is. This is the or igin (00 ') of W ittgen-
stein's nor ion of showingas distinguished from saying (Hinrikka and H in t ikka
1986, p. 2; emphases in orig inal).
However, this say/show distinction presupposes the existence of certain
limits on our language ("There [in the Tractatus] the limits of language are
connected explicitly with the doctr ine of showing" (I986, p. 17)), limits
the illusory nature of which it is now Putnam's concern to demonstrate.
Putnarn's claim is that, contrary to standard interpretation, the Wittgen-
stein of the Tractatus is concerned not with advancing the ses about the logi-
cal structure of language (given, on this standard interpretation , the ineffa-
bility (inexpressibility) of semant ics, the logical structure or syntax of
language is the only thing that can be discussed), but with revealing the non-
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s e n s i c a l n a t u r e o f s u c h t h e s e s . C e n t r a l t o t h i s a c t i v i t y - a n d I u s e t h e w o r d
' a c t i v i t y ' a d v i s e d l y , f o r t h i s i s h o w W i t t g e n s t e i n c h a r a c t e r i s e s p h i l o s o p h y -
i s a n e 1 u c i d a t o r y s t r a t e g y , o n e w h i c h r e v e a l s h o w w e a r e p r o n e t o b e l i e v e
t h a t w e h a v e g i v e n m e a n i n g t o s o m e o r a l l o f t h e c o n s t i t u e n t p a r t s o f a
p r o p o s i t i o n ( i n t h i s c a s e , p r o p o s i t i o n s c o n c e r n i n g t h e l o g i c a l s t r u c t u r e o f
l a n g u a g e ) w h e n w e h a v e n o t d o n e s o . W i t t g e n s t e i n c a p t u r e s t h i s t h o u g h t i n
5 . 4 7 3 3 o f t h e T r a c t a t u s b y s a y i n g t h a t i f a s e n t e n c e " h a s n o s e n s e , t h a t c a n
o n l y b e b e c a u s e w e h a v e f a i l e d t o g i v e a m e a n i n g t o s o m e o f i t s c o n s t i t u e n t
p a r t s . ( E v e n i f w e b e l i e v e t h a t w e h a v e d o n e s o ) " .
I n d e s c r i b i n g t h i s f i r s t f e a t u r e o f P u t n a r r i ' s d i a l e c t i c a l m e t h o d , I a m d e -
s c r i b i n g w h a t i s , i n e f f e c t , t h e c o n t e n t o f t h i s m e t h o d . F o r P u r n a r n , a c e n -
t r a l s t r a t e g y i n t h e t a s k o f e x p o s i n g i l l u s i o n s o f t h o u g h t c o n s i s t s i n a t y p e
o f s e l f - r e f u t a t i o n c r i t i c i s m . T h i s c r i t i c i s m c h a l l e n g e s t h e i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y o f
c e r t a i n t h e o r e t i c a l c o n c e p t i o n s o f t r u t h a n d r a t i o n a l i t y t h r o u g h a d e m o n -
s t r a t i o n o f t h e i n c o h e r e n c e o f t h o s e c o n c e p t i o n s w h e n t h e y a r e e x a m i n e d
a g a i n s t t h e v a r i o u s a r g u m e n t a t i v e , d e s c r i p t i v e a n d e x p l a n a r o r y p r a c t i c e s
n e e d e d t o e s t a b l i s h t h e m . I n e a c h s u c h c r i t i c i s m , t h e e m p h a s i s o n p r a c t i c e
i s i n t e n d e d t o r e v e a l a f o r m o f r a t i o n a l i t y w h i c h i s e x c l u d e d f r o m t h e p a r -
t i c u l a r t h e o r e t i c a l c o n c e p t i o n o f t h e c a s e , b u t i n t h e a b s e n c e o f w h i c h n o
s e n s e c a n b e m a d e o f t h a t c o n c e p t i o n . W h a t m a k e s i t s e e m t h a t t h e s e t h e o -
r e t i c a l c o n c e p t i o n s a r e e v e n p o s s i b l e i s t h e c o n v i c t i o n t h a t w e c a n a s s u m e a
m e t a p h y s i c a l s t a n d p o i n t , a s t a n d p o i n t f r o m w i t h i n w h i c h w e t a k e o u r s e l v e s
t o b e a t t r i b u t i n g s i g n i f i c a n c e t o t h o s e c o n c e p t i o n s w h e n i n f a c t t h i s i s n o t
t h e c a s e - t h i s s t a n d p o i n t l a c k s t h e c o n c e p t s w h i c h a r e n e c e s s a r y f o r t h e m a k -
i n g o f s u c h a t t r i b u t i o n s . O n t h e d i a l e c t i c a l v i e w t h a t I a m d e v e l o p i n g t h e
a s s u m p t i o n o f a m e t a p h y s i c a l s t a n d p o i n t i s i n t i m a t e l y a s s o c i a t e d w i t h t h e
a c t i v i t y o f t h e o r i s i n g . F o r t h e o r i s i n g , a t l e a s t w i t h i n t h e c o n t e x t o f p h i l o -
s o p h i c a l d i s c u s s i o n s , c o n s i s t s i n t h e a t t e m p t t o f u l l y c i r c u m s c r i b e c o n c e p t s
s u c h a s r a t i o n a l i t y a n d r e f e r e n c e , t h a t i s , t o d e s c r i b e t h e s e c o n c e p t s w i t h o u t
i n t u r n p r e s u p p o s i n g t h e s e c o n c e p t s , a n u n d e r t a k i n g w h i c h d e r i v e s t h e s e m -
b l a n c e o f p o s s i b i l i t y f r o m w i t h i n a m e t a p h y s i c a l s t a n d p o i n t , t h a t i s , f r o m
w i t h i n a s t a n d p o i n t w h i c h d o e s n o t p r e s u p p o s e r a t i o n a l i t y . I r e t u r n t o t h e s e
i s s u e s i n s u b s e q u e n t d i s c u s s i o n . F o r t h e m o m e n t , I e x a m i n e t w o o t h e r d i s -
t i n c t i v e f e a t u r e s o f P u t n a r n ' s d i a l e c t i c a l m e t h o d .
T h e s e c o n d a n d t h i r d f e a t u r e s o f P u t n a r n ' s d i a l e c t i c c a n b e d e m o n -
s t r a t e d b y m e a n s o f a c o m p a r i s o n o f t h a t d i a l e c t i c w i t h a s p e c t s o f F r e g e ' s
t h o u g h t . P u m a r n ' s d i a l e c t i c a s s u m e s t h e r o l e o f a p r o p a e d e u t i c , a t y p e o f
p r e p a r a t o r y a c t i v i t y u n d e r t a k e n p r i o r t o p h i l o s o p h y , w i t h t h e p u r p o s e o f
c i r c u m s c r i b i n g t h e a p p r o p r i a t e d o m a i n o f s t u d y f o r p h i l o s o p h y . ( A s s t a t e d
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here, the features of this propaedeutic have been left deliberately undevel-
oped to permit a comparison of this propaedeuric with the view of Frege).
When Frege discusses elucidation it is with such a propaedeutical role in
mind. In this way, Frege intends his e1ucidations to convey the logical dis-
tinctions which form the basis of his Begriffsschrift (concept-notation).
However, these same elucidarions cannot be expressed as part of the Be-
griffsschrift -they are strictly transitional in nature . It is what these eluci-
dations give way to that provides the connection with the third feature of
Putnarn'saccounr, its avoidance of theory. When Frege rejects any role for
e1ucidations within his Begriffsschrift, he is in effect claiming that elucida-
tions have no place in the system of a science. In this way, Frege conceives
of rwo distinct types of activity, the one elucidation and the other the con-
struction of a formal language in which the logical relations of ordinary
language are rendered explicit. However, Putnam is anxious to avoid the
type of theoretical system-building which underlies Prege's Begriffsschrift.
As James Conant states in the introduction to Putnarn's Words and Lift,
"He [Purnarn] says that what he is offering should not be taken for a philo-
sophical theory in the traditional sense" (1994a, p. xi). Just what sense of
theory, if any, Putnam is prepared to countenance in philosophy is, at this
time, more properly a matter of speculation. What is clear, however, is
that Putnarn is not content to rest with the Tractarian point that "The result
of philosophy is not a number of 'philosophical propositions', but to make
propositions clear" (4.112).
In order to elaborate upon the propaedeutical and theory-avoidance fea-
tures of Putnam's dialectic, I want to draw a distinction berween the con-
text of this dialectical method and the outcome of this method. The notion
of context is central ro the propaedeutical functioning of Purnam's dialec-
tic. To see this , consider again how this propaedeutical component of Put-
nam's account was introduced in the above discussion. There the role of this
component was described as one of circumscribing the appropriate domain
of study for philosophy. That domain, I now want to suggest , is character-
ised by a descriptive process in which concepts are shown to be essentially
interrelated and not, importantly, susceptible of any complete description
of their extent. Yet it is only by virtue of the critici sm of a prior contex t of
inquiry, namely, that of the self-refutation arguments described earlier,
that the need for such a descriptive process becomes evident (self-refutation
arguments, I will demonstrate subsequently, reveal the conceptual depend-
ence of a circumscribed concept of rationality on a prior notion of ration-
ality, that is, on a notion of rationality which is not part of the circurn-
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s c r i b e d c o n c e p t ) . T h e i n q u i r y o f t h i s p r i o r c o n t e x t e s c h e w s t h e o r y -
c o n s t r u c t i o n i n f a v o u r o f a f o r m o f c r i t i c a l p h i l o s o p h y . M o r e o v e r , t h i s
c r i t i c a l p h i l o s o p h y i s d i s t i n c t i n k i n d f r o m t h e c r i t i c i s m w h i c h c h a r a c t e r -
i s e s t r a d i t i o n a l p h i l o s o p h i c a l i n q u i r y - i t c o n s i s t s i n c r i t i c i s m o f t h e o p p o s -
i n g p o s i t i o n s o f a p h i l o s o p h i c a l d e b a t e i n t h e a b s e n c e o f a n y p r i o r c o m -
m i t m e n t o n t h e p a r t o f t h e p h i l o s o p h e r t o e i t h e r o f t h o s e p o s i t i o n s ( i t
s h o u l d b e n o t e d t h a t c r i t i c i s m f r o m w i t h o u t a p h i l o s o p h i c a l p o s i t i o n i s n o t
t h e s a m e a s c r i t i c i s m f r o m w i t h o u t a c o n c e p t u a l s c h e m e - t h e f o r m e r t y p e
o f c r i t i c i s m i s a d e s c r i p t i o n o f t h e m e t h o d o l o g y o f P u t n a m i a n d i a l e c t i c ,
w h i l e t h e l a t t e r r y p e o f c r i t i c i s m i s a d e s c r i p t i o n o f t h e k i n d o f t h e o r i s i n g
o p p o s e d b y t h a t d i a l e c t i c ) . N o w , w h i l e c r i t i c a l p h i l o s o p h y d o m i n a t e s t h i s
i n i t i a l c o n t e x t o f i n q u i r y , i t s e e m s t h a t t h i s s a m e c r i t i c a l a p p r o a c h c a n
n e v e r b e e n t i r e l y l a c k i n g f r o m t h e d e s c r i p t i v e f o r m o f p h i l o s o p h i c a l i n -
q u i r y w h i c h i s e s t a b l i s h e d a s t h e o u t c o m e o f P u t n a m i a n d i a l e c t i c . F o r r e -
g a r d l e s s o f t h e n a t u r e o f t h i s e m e r g e n t i n q u i r y , s o m e o n g o i n g a s s e s s m e n t o f
i t s i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y i s r e q u i r e d , s u c h i s t h e p e r v a s i v e n e s s o f t h e i l l u s i o n s o f
t h o u g h t t o w h i c h w e a r e s u b j e c t i n p h i l o s o p h y .
I t c a n t h u s b e s e e n t h a t P u t n a r n i a n d i a l e c t i c f u n c t i o n s b y m e a n s o f a n i n -
t e r a c t i o n o f t h e c o n t e n t , t h e c o n t e x t a n d t h e o u t c o m e f e a t u r e s o f t h a t
m e t h o d . U n d o u b t e d l y , a d d i t i o n a l f e a t u r e s o f t h i s m e t h o d r e m a i n t o b e
d i s c o v e r e d a n d d e v e l o p e d . F o r t h e m o m e n t , h o w e v e r , I c o n s i d e r t h e d e -
t a i l s o f t h i s d i a l e c t i c a l m e t h o d s u c h a s t h e y r e l a t e t o t h e c r i t i c i s m o f c e r -
t a i n p h i l o s o p h i c a l p o s i t i o n s .
1 . T h e f a c t / v a l u e d i c h o t o m y
I n h i s 1 9 8 1 p u b l i c a t i o n R e a s o n , T r u t h a n d H i s t o r y , P u r n a r n c h a l l e n g e s a
n u m b e r o f d i c h o t o m i e s , d i c h o t o m i e s w h o s e i n f l u e n c e e x t e n d s b e y o n d
s t r i c t l y p h i l o s o p h i c a l c o n c e r n s - . I n r e l a t i o n t o o n e s u c h d i c h o t o m y , t h a t o f
f a c t a n d v a l u e , h e d e s c r i b e s h i s m e t h o d o f a r g u m e n t a s f o l l o w s :
T h e s r r a t e g y o f m y a r g u m e n r i s n o t g o i n g r o b e a n e w o n e . I ' m g o i n g r o r e h a b i l i -
t a t e a s o m e w h a t d i s c r e d i t e d m o v e i n t h e d e b a t e a b o u t f a c t a n d v a l u e . n a m e l y t h e
m o v e t h a t c o n s i s t s i n a r g u i n g t h a t t h e d i s t i n c t i o n i s a t t h e v e r y l e a s t h o p e l e s s l y
f u z z y b e c a u s e f a c t u a l s t a t e m e n t s t h e m s e l v e s , a n d t h e p r a c t i c e s o f s c i e n t i f i c i n q u i r y
u p o n w h i c h w e r e l y r o d e c i d e w h a t i s a n d w h a t i s n o t a f a c t , p r e s u p p o s e v a l u e s ( p .
1 2 8 ) .
P u t n a r n r e l a t e s t h e d i s c r e d i t e d n a t u r e o f s u c h a m o v e t o a ' p r o t e c t i v e
c o n c e s s i o n ' a d v a n c e d b y t h e p r o p o n e n t s o f t h e d i c h o t o m y : " T h e d e f e n d e r s
2 4 2 T H E O R / A - S e g u n d a E p o c a
V o l. 1 6 / 2 , 2 0 0 1 , 2 3 7 - 2 6 8
Louise CUMMI NGS THE DIALECTICAL THINKING OF HILARY PUTNAM
of the fact-value dichotomy concede that science does presuppose some
values, for example, science presupposes that we want truth, but argue that
these values are not ethicalvalues" (p. 128). In demonstration of the inade-
quacy of this view, Putnam invites the reader to entertain the hypothesis
that we are all Brains in a Vat3;
I want the reader to imagine that this crazy (and, I would claim, incoherent) the-
ory , the theory that we are all brain s in a vat , is held not by an isolated lun ati c, but
by virtually all the peopl e in some large country, say, Australia . Imagine that in
Australia onl y a small minority of the people believe what we do and the great ma-
jo rity believe that we are Brain s in a Vat. Perhaps the Australians belie ve thi s be-
cause they are all d isciples of a Guru, the G uru of Sydney, perhaps. Perh aps wh en
we talk to th em the y say, 'Oh if you could talk ro th e Guru of Sydney and look into
his eyes and see what a good , kind , wise man he is, you too would be co nvinced .' And
if we ask, 'But how does the G uru of Sydney know that we arc brains in a vat, if the
illusion is as perfect as you say?,' they might reply, 'Oh, the Guru of Sydney just
knows.' (1981, p. 131) .
Putnam has a clear aim in this context: to expound the presuppositions
of a scientific world view. This he achieve s by bringing the scient ist 's view
into conflict with the distinctly un scientific perspective of the Brain-in-a-
Vatist. The scientist must defend his outlook in the presence of the vatist
and it is here that appeal is made to a number of methodological virtues.
Firstl y, the varisr's world view lacks a certain coherence, the type of coher-
ence which can be shown to characterise the scientific viewpoint: "O ne of
the things that we aim at is that we should be able to give an account of
how we know our statements to be true" (p. 132). The vatist , however, has
no notion of coherence within his system:
The Australians, remember, have themselves postulated an illusion so perfect that
there is no rational way in which th e Guru of Sydney can possibly know th at the be-
lief system which he has ado pted and persuaded all the others to ado pt is co rrect (p.
133).
Again, the varist' s world view lacks the comp rehensiveness of the scientist's
system:
Their belief system (...) agrees with ours concern ing what the laws of nature are in
the image, but does it tell us whether or not the laws of nature that ap pear to hold in
the image arc the laws of nature that actually hold outside the vat ? If it fai ls to,
then it lacks a certain kind o f comprehensivene ss wh ich we aim after, for it does
not, even in its own term s, tell wh at the true and ultimate laws of nature arc (p.
133).
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F i n a l l y , t h e v a t i s r ' s w o r l d v i e w i s n o t f u n c t i o n a l l y s i m p l e :
( . . . ) t h e v e r y f a c t t h a t t h e B r a i n i n a V a r i s r t h e o r y p o s t u l a t e s a l l k i n d s o f o b j e c t s o u t -
s i d e t h e v a t w h i c h p l a y n o r o l e i n t h e e x p l a n a t i o n o f o u r e x p e r i e n c e s , a c c o r d i n g t o
t h e t h e o r y i t s e l f , m a k e s i t c l e a r t h a t t h i s i s a c a s e i n w h i c h w e c a n d e f i n i t e l y s a y t h a t
t h e m a x i m ( . . . ) ' d o n ' t m u l t i p l y e n t i t i e s w i t h o u t n e c e s s i t y ' i s v i o l a t e d ( p , 1 3 3 ) .
I w a n t t o e x a m i n e t h e d i a l e c t i c a l n a t u r e o f t h i s c a s e . F o r P u t n a r n , t h e
v a l u e s d i s c u s s e d i n t h i s c o n t e x t , i n a d d i t i o n t o o t h e r v a l u e s n o t e v i d e n t i n
t h e p r e s e n t s c e n a r i o , e . g . i n s t r u m e n t a l e f f i c a c y , b u i l d " a p i c t u r e o f s c i e n c e
a s p r e s u p p o s i n g a r i c h s y s t e m o f v a l u e s " C p . 1 3 4 ) . T h e s e v a l u e p r e s u p p o s i -
t i o n s , i t w a s a r g u e d , e n a b l e t h e s c i e n t i s t t o e n g a g e i n d i s c u s s i o n o f h i s
w o r l d v i e w - t h e s c i e n t i s t i s a b l e t o g i v e a n a c c o u n t o f h o w h e k n o w s h i s
s t a t e m e n t s t o b e t r u e , o f h o w t h e l a w s o f n a t u r e r e p r e s e n t e d b y h i s t h e o r i e s
a r e t h e t r u e l a w s o f n a t u r e a n d o f h o w t h e o b j e c t s p o s t u l a t e d b y h i s t h e o r i e s
a r e e s s e n t i a l t o a n e x p l a n a t i o n o f h i s e x p e r i e n c e s . T h e v a t i s t , o n t h e o t h e r
h a n d , h a s n o s u c h a c c e s s t o r a t i o n a l d i s c u s s i o n . H e h a s e n v i s a g e d a n i l l u s i o n
s o p e r f e c t t h a t t h e l i m i t s o f h i s w o r l d v i e w a r e c o e x t e n s i v e w i t h t h e l i m i t s
o f d i s c o u r s e i t s e l f - r h e v a t i s t i s , a f t e r a l l , t o h a v e n o m e a n s o f k n o w i n g t h a t
h e i s a b r a i n i n a v a t . H o w e v e r , t h e c i r c u m s c r i b e d c o n c e p t o f r a t i o n a l i t y
w h i c h f o l l o w s f r o m t h i s v i e w p r e c l u d e s a l l d i s c u s s i o n a n d u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f
t h e v a t i s t ' s p o s i t i o n . I n s p e c i f i c t e r m s , t h e v a r i s t c a n n o t s a y h o w h e k n o w s
h i s s t a t e m e n t s t o b e t r u e - t o i n t r o d u c e t h e n o t i o n o f a c o r r e s p o n d e n c e t o r e -
a l i t y i s , i n f a c t , t o i n v a l i d a t e t h e v a t i s r ' s c l a i m t o b e a b r a i n i n a v a r t . A l s o ,
t h e v a r i s r i s a t a l o s s t o e x p l a i n t h e r o l e p l a y e d b y t h e e v i l s c i e n t i s t > i n h i s
a c c o u n t - h e c a n n o t e v e n t h i n k a b o u t t h e e v i l s c i e n t i s t i f h e i s a b r a i n i n a v a t .
A n d t h e l a w s w h i c h h o l d f o r h i m a s a b r a i n i n a v a t c a n n o t b e d e s c r i b e d o r
e x p l a i n e d i n r e l a t i o n t o a n y s o r t o f r e a l i t y o u t s i d e o f t h e v a t - t h e v a t i s t h a s
n o a c c e s s t o t h i s r e a l i t y f r o m h i s p o s i t i o n w i t h i n t h e v a t . I n e a c h c a s e , t h e
e x p l a n a t i o n a n d r e f l e c t i o n i n v o l v e d r e q u i r e s a p r i o r n o t i o n o f r a t i o n a l i t y , a
f o r m o f r a t i o n a l i t y w h i c h e x i s t s a p a r t f r o m a n y a t t e m p t e d c i r c u m s c r i p t i o n
o f r a t i o n a l i t y . Y e t s u c h a p r i o r n o t i o n i s e n t i r e l y l a c k i n g w i t h i n t h e v a t i s r ' s
a c c o u n t . M o r e o v e r , t h e v a t i s t ' s p r o b l e m s d o n o t e n d w i t h a l a c k o f r a t i o n a l
d i s c u s s i o n o f h i s p o s i t i o n . I n t h e a b s e n c e o f a p r i o r n o t i o n o f r a t i o n a l i t y i t
i s n o t e v e n c l e a r t h a t t h e r e i s a p o s i t i o n t o b e d i s c u s s e d . T h e c l a i m t h a t w e
a r e b r a i n s i n a v a t o n l y c o n s t i t u t e s a p o s i t i o n f o r t h e v a t i s r b y v i r t u e o f t h e
f a c t t h a t t h e c o n t e x t i s o n e o f a n a r g u m e n t a t i v e e x c h a n g e w i t h t h e s c i e n t i s t .
H a d t h e p u r p o s e f o r w h i c h t h e c l a i m w a s e m p l o y e d b e e n d i f f e r e n t o r , a s i s
c u r r e n t l y b e i n g c o n s i d e r e d , h a d t h e r e b e e n n o p u r p o s e a t a l l - i n h i s p u r s u i t
o f a n a l l - e n c o m p a s s i n g i l l u s i o n t h e v a r i s r w a n t s t o d e p r i v e u s o f a p r i o r
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concept of purpose- then it is not clear in what sense the vatist could be said
to have a position. Lacking the related concept of purpose, the entire notion
of a position in this context begins to disintegrate.
However, the dialectical case against the vatisr does not end here. The
vatist, it will be recalled, has envisaged an illusion so perfect that he has no
rationah way of knowing that he is a brain in a vat. In the same way, he can-
not be said to say or think that he is a brain in a vat. For his thought and as-
sertion occur within the vat, a position which precludes all reference to the
vat. To say or think the thesis 'we are brains in a vat' -in the only sense of
saying and thinking which is intelligible to us, that which involves reference
to an external world- requires that the vatist assume a position outside of
the vat. Then, however, it cannot be the case that the vatist is a brain in a vat.
The structure of a self-refutation argument is evident -if the statement that
we are brains in a vat is true, then the fact of our saying or thinking this
statement to be true shows that it must be false (reference to the state of af-
fairs represented by the thesis invalidates the thesis). Hence, it is false?
For Putnarn, the vatisr's dilemma can be characterised as follows:
Could we, if we were brains in a vat in this way, say or think rhar we wer e? 1 am go-
ing to argue that the answer is 'N o, we couldn't.' In fact, 1 am going to argue that
the supposition that we are actually brains in a vat , alth ough it violates no physical
law, and is perfectly con sisrenr wirh everyrhing we have experienced, cannot possi-
bly be true, It cannot possibly be true, because it is, in a cerr ain way, self-refuting
(Putnarn 1981, p. 7; emphases in or iginal) .
It thus emerges that the vatisr is compelled by the presuppositions of his
own reflective practice to concede the incompleteness of his illusion. For
the vatist to say or th ink that he is a brain in a vat presupposes a relation of
reference to the vat. However, this same reference relation presupposes an
epistemological standpoint outside of the vat , a standpoint which invali-
dates the vatist's claim to be a brain in a vat8. Moreover, the outcome of
this dialectical criticism is a demonstration of the unintelligibility, not the
falsity, of the vatist's claim", The vatist's illusion is so perfect that it en-
compasses all forms of rational discourse. In such a case, however, there is
no residual (prior) notion of rationality with which to make senseof the va-
tist's claim to be a brain in a vat. In fact, the notion of an epistemological
standpoint and of a residual form of rationality amount to one and the
same thing in this context -both ideas attest to the failure of the attempt to
describe rationality in a fully circumscribed way. For any account of ra-
tionality or, in the present case, any illusion intended to be coextensive
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w i t h r a t i o n a l i t y , m u s t i t s e l f p r e s u p p o s e r a t i o n a l i t y . T h i s c o n c l u s i o n t u r n s
o n a p a r t i c u l a r u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f l a n g u a g e ' u s e ' , o n e w h i c h P u t n a m a t t r i b u t e s
t o t h e l a t e r W i t t g e n s t e i n , i n w h i c h t o d e s c r i b e t h e w o r d s i n a l a n g u a g e -
g a m e ( t h i n k o f r a t i o n a l i t y a s b e l o n g i n g t o j u s t s u c h a l a n g u a g e - g a m e ) r e -
q u i r e s t h a t w e e m p l o y t h e w o r d s w i t h i n t h a t s a m e g a m e :
I f o n e w a n t s t o t a l k o f t h e u s e o f t h e s e n t e n c e " T h e r e i s a c o f f e e t a b l e i n f r o n t 0 f
m e " , o n e h a s t o t a l k a b o u t s e e i n g a n d f e e l i n g c o f f e e t a b l e s , a m o n g o t h e r t h i n g s . I n
s h o r t , o n e h a s t o m e n t i o n p e r c e i v i n g c o f f e e t a b l e s ( P u r n a m 1 9 9 4 a , p . 2 8 3 ) .
I n t h e s a m e w a y t h a t a n y a c c o u n t o f p e r c e p t i o n m u s t f i r s t m a k e u s e o f
p e r c e p t i o n l a n g u a g e , s o a n y a c c o u n t o f r a t i o n a l i t y m u s t f i r s t e m p l o y t h e
l a n g u a g e o f r a t i o n a l i t y , i . e . t h e l a n g u a g e o f t h e g a m e i n w h i c h r a t i o n a l i t y
h a s i t s h o m e . M o r e o v e r , t h e d e c i s i o n t o u p r o o t t h e c o n c e p t o f r a t i o n a l i t y
f r o m i t s l a n g u a g e - g a m e - t h e f a v o u r i t e p u r s u i t o f p h i l o s o p h e r s a n d c o g n i t i v e
s c i e n t i s t s I 0 a l i k e - i s t h e d e c i s i o n w h i c h s e t s u s o n t h e r o u t e o f a t t e m p t i n g t o
f o r m u l a t e a c o m p l e t e a c c o u n t o f r a t i o n a l i t y , i . e . a n a c c o u n t w h i c h d o e s n o t
p r e s u p p o s e r a t i o n a l i t y . H o w e v e r , w e c a n n o t e v e n m a k e s e n s e o f a c o m p l e t e
d e s c r i p t i o n o f r a t i o n a l i t y , f o r t h e r e a s o n t h a t w e l a c k t h e c o n c e p t s n e e d e d
t o m a k e t h a t d e s c r i p t i o n i n t e l l i g i b l e t o u s .
I n t h e b r a i n s - i n - a - v a t s c e n a r i o , t h e v a t i s t r e j e c t s t h e n o t i o n o f a n e p i s t e -
m o l o g i c a l s t a n d p o i n t i n f a v o u r o f a m e t a p h y s i c a l s t a n d p o i n t . T h i s s t a n d -
p o i n t e x i s t s a p a r t f r o m a l l h u m a n c o n c e p t s a n d f r o m a l l m o d e s o f c o n c e p -
r u a l i s a r i o n . I t i s , t o u s e P u r n a r n ' s t e r m , a G o d ' s E y e p o i n t o f v i e w , a v a n -
t a g e p o i n t f r o m w h i c h t h e w h o l e o f r a t i o n a l d i s c o u r s e c a n b e s u r v e y e d
w i t h o u t i n t u r n p r e s u p p o s i n g s u c h d i s c o u r s e . T h e v a t i s t b e l i e v e s t h a t h e c a n
a s s u m e t h i s s t a n d p o i n t a n d , t h r o u g h d o i n g s o , t h a t h e c a n a c h i e v e t h e c o m -
p l e t e n e s s o f h i s i l l u s i o n t h r o u g h t h e t o t a l s u b s u m p t i o n o f r a t i o n a l i t y w i t h i n
t h a t i l l u s i o n . H o w e v e r , t h i s c o m p l e t e n e s s i s a c h i e v e d a t t h e e x p e n s e o f t h e
i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y o f t h e v a r i s t ' s i l l u s i o n . F o r i n t h e a b s e n c e o f a p r i o r n o t i o n o f
r a t i o n a l i t y w e c a n n o t s o m u c h a s m a k e s e n s e o f t h i s i l l u s i o n . T h e u n i n t e l l i -
g i b i l i t y o f t h e v a r i s r ' s c l a i m , n o w i d e n t i f i e d a s a p r o b l e m o f p e r s p e c t i v e ,
c a n o n l y b e a d e q u a t e l y r e v e a l e d t h r o u g h a n u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e i m p u l s e t o
t h a t p e r s p e c t i v e . T h e r e f o r e , I t u r n t o a n e x a m i n a t i o n o f t h i s i m p u l s e , s u c h
a s i t r e l a t e s t o t h e c e n t r a l m e t a p h y s i c a l i s s u e o f r e a l i s m .
2 . M e t a p h y s i c a l r e a l i s m
N o s i n g l e p h i l o s o p h i c a l p o s i t i o n h a s o c c u p i e d P u r n a r n ' s t h i n k i n g m o r e
t h a n m e t a p h y s i c a l r e a l i s m . T h i s l o n g - s t a n d i n g e n g a g e m e n t w i t h t h e m e t a -
2 4 6 T H E O R I A - S e g u n d a E p o c a
v s t . 1 6 / 2 , 2 0 0 1 , 2 3 7 - 2 6 8
Louise CUMMINGS THE DIALECTICAL THINKING OF HILARY PUTNAM
physical realist provides fertile ground indeed for an examination of Put-
narn's dialectical method. Metaphysical realism is, as described by Put-
nam, "a bundle of intimately associated philosophical ideas about truth"
(1988, p. 107). Its assumptions are threefold. Firstly, there is a unique cor-
respondence relation between the propositions of language and features of
the external world. Secondly, there is One True Theory of this external
world or mind-independent reality. And thirdly, there is a commitment
to bivalence, such that each proposition of language must be either true or
false. Putnarn employs these assumptions of the metaphysical realist within










(I) <Uj ; Ri/i=1, 2,..., k) Inrended model of the languagc in Wj relative to interpretation I
(2) Pj(Rllj ) 1= Rllj PERMUTA TION
(3) <Uj ; Pj(Rij) (i=1, 2,..., k) INTERPRETATION J
(4) Pj(Rij) 1= Rij PERMUTA TION
(5) <Uj ; Pj(~ iil (i=1,2,..., k) } ISOMORPHIC
(6) <Uj ; Rij(l= 1, 2,..., k)
Figure 1: MODEL-THEORETIC ARGUMENT
(based on Appendix. Putnam 1981)
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C e n t r a l t o t h i s a r g u m e n t i s a l a n g u a g e w h i c h h a s b e e n f o r m a l i s e d . T h i s
l a n g u a g e c o n t a i n s a r a n g e o f p r e d i c a t e s w h i c h d i f f e r i n t h e i r n u m b e r o f a r -
g u m e n t p l a c e s . I n t h i s w a y , t h e l a n g u a g e m a y c o n t a i n m o n a d i c p r e d i c a t e s ,
s u c h a s x i s f a t ; d y a d i c p r e d i c a t e s , s u c h a s x i s t h e f a t h e r o f y ; a n d t r i a d i c
p r e d i c a t e s , s u c h a s x i s b e t w e e n y a n d z . T h i s a r g u m e n t a l s o e m p l o y s a s e t
o f p o s s i b l e w o r l d s . T h i s s e t c o n t a i n s t h e a c t u a l w o r l d w h i c h d i f f e r s f r o m
o t h e r p o s s i b l e w o r l d s i n t h a t i t i s r e a l i s e d . N e x t , t h e r e i s t h e s e t o f p o s s i -
b l e i n d i v i d u a l s . U , r e p r e s e n t s a l l t h e i n d i v i d u a l s i n t h e p o s s i b l e w o r l d W
j
,
a n d e q u a l l y , U , r e p r e s e n t s a l l t h e i n d i v i d u a l s i n t h e p o s s i b l e w o r l d W
j
• F i -
n a l l y , t h e r e i s e x t e n s i o n , s u c h t h a t R ; i s t h e e x t e n s i o n o f t h e p r e d i c a t e F , i n
t h e p o s s i b l e w o r l d W
j
. E q u a l l y , R
l I j
i s t h e e x t e n s i o n o f t h e p r e d i c a t e F
l I
i n
t h e p o s s i b l e w o r l d W
j
• T h r e e t e r m s a r e c l o s e l y r e l a t e d i n t h i s c o n t e x t . T h e
f i r s t t e r m i s e x t e n s i o n , t h e s e t o f t h i n g s t h a t a p r e d i c a t e r e f e r s t o i n a s i n g l e
p o s s i b l e w o r l d . N e x t t h e r e i s t h e i n t e n s i o n o f a p r e d i c a t e . A n i n t e n s i o n o f
a p r e d i c a t e i s o b t a i n e d w h e n t h a t p r e d i c a t e i s a s s i g n e d a n e x t e n s i o n i n e a c h
p o s s i b l e w o r l d . F i n a l l y , t h e r e i s t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f t h e l a n g u a g e . A n i n -
t e r p r e t a t i o n i s o b t a i n e d w h e n a n i n t e n s i o n h a s b e e n a s s i g n e d t o e v e r y p r e d i -
c a t e o f t h e l a n g u a g e . F i g u r e 1 r e p r e s e n t s o n e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f t h e l a n g u a g e ,
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n I . I w a n t t o l o o k a t a s e c o n d i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f t h e l a n g u a g e ,
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n J . T h i s s e c o n d i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s t h e r e s u l t o f a p e r m u t a t i o n
p e r f o r m e d o n t h e s e t D j . A s c a n b e s e e n f r o m t h e i n t e r c o n n e c t i n g a r r o w s o n
t h e d i a g r a m , s u c h a p e r m u t a t i o n w i l l e f f e c t c h a n g e s i n t h e e n t i r e s y s t e m ,
s u c h t h a t t h e e x t e n s i o n o f F , i n t h e p o s s i b l e w o r l d W
j
w i l l n o l o n g e r b e R
j j
,
a n d t h e e x t e n s i o n o f F
l I
i n t h e p o s s i b l e w o r l d W
j
w i l l n o l o n g e r b e R
l I j
. I n
e f f e c t , a s i t u a t i o n i s c r e a t e d i n w h i c h o n e a n d t h e s a m e p r e d i c a t e h a s a d i f -
f e r e n t r e f e r e n c e r e l a t i o n u n d e r e a c h n e w i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f t h e l a n g u a g e , t o
t h e d e g r e e w h e r e F , c a n r e f e r t o t h e s e t o f t h i n g s w h i c h a r e b a l d u n d e r i n -
t e r p r e t a t i o n I , t h e s e t o f t h i n g s w h i c h a r e f a t u n d e r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n J , t h e s e t
o f t h i n g s w h i c h a r e r e d u n d e r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n K , a n d s o o n .
T o d e m o n s t r a t e t h i s f u r t h e r , i m a g i n e t h e c a s e o f t h e a c t u a l w o r l d i n
w h i c h t h e c a t i s o n t h e m a t a n d t h e c h e r r y i s o n t h e t r e e . I n t h e a c t u a l w o r l d
t h e t e r m ' c a t ' r e f e r s t o t h e s e t o f c a t s a n d t h e t e r m ' m a t ' r e f e r s t o t h e s e t o f
m a t s . T h e s t a t e m e n t ' t h e c a t i s o n t h e m a t ' a n d t h e s t a t e m e n t ' t h e c h e r r y i s
o n t h e t r e e ' a r e b o t h t r u e i n t h e a c t u a l w o r l d . A p e r m u t a t i o n w h i c h m a p s t h e
s e t o f c a t s o n t o t h e s e t o f c h e r r i e s a n d t h e s e t o f m a t s o n t o t h e s e t o f t r e e s
h a s t h e e f f e c t o f m a i n t a i n i n g t h e o r i g i n a l t r u t h - v a l u e o f e a c h o f t h e s t a t e -
m e n t s ( t h e d i f f e r e n t m o d e l s o f t h e l a n g u a g e a r e , a f t e r a l l , i s o m o r p h i c ) ,
w h i l e a l t e r i n g t h e r e f e r e n c e r e l a t i o n s o f t h e i r c o m p o n e n t t e r m s - t h e t e r m
' c a t ' n o w r e f e r s t o t h e s e t o f c h e r r i e s , e t e . W h e n t h i s p r o c e d u r e i s a p p l i e d
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across all possible worlds for each of the sentences of the language, the re-
sult is a thoroughgoing indeterminacy of reference:
(...) there arc infinitely many admissible models of our languagc. i.e.• infinirely
many models which satisfy all operational and rheorerical constraints. If the enti-
ties that these models consist of are thought of as mind-independent discourse-
independent entities, then the claim that just one of these models is the unique 'in-
tended' model becomes utterly mysterious. Each of these models corresponds to a
reference relation. So there are infinitely many admissible reference relations, RI'
R2, R3.... Someone who believes that just one of these. say Rl7 , really is the unique
real reference relation. the reference relation, believes that the word 'reference' is
attached to RI? (and not to RI ' R2>" ') with metaphysical glue (I983, p. 295; emphases
in original) .
As Purnam sees it, the problem with metaphysical realism is that "it
leaves us with no intelligible way to refute ontological relativity" (1994a,
p. 280). Yet we cannot accept ontological relativity, for we cannot even
make sense
of the idea that the world consists of objects anyone of which is a quark in one ad-
missible model, the Eiffel Tower in a second admissible model (...) but is no
more intrinsically anyone of these than any other (p. 280).
The paradoxical nature of a conclusion of ontological relativity is con-
strued by Purnam as a rejection of the position, metaphysical realism, that
led to that conclusion. In this way, Putnam is using his model-theoretic ar-
gument as a reductio argument against the metaphysical realist. Quine's re-
sponse to this indeterminacy in our own language is to 'choose as our man-
ual of translation the identity transformation, thus taking the whole lan-
guage at face value' and he has it in mind that "reference is then explicated
in disquotational paradigms analogous to Tarski's truth paradigm" (1990,
p. 52). A different response to this indeterminacy is given by Michael
Devitt (1984). For Devitt, the true relation of reference is itself a causal
connection which, for the purposes of the present analysis, is exemplified
by the relation RI? above. A more recent account, that of Jerry Fodor
(1990), appeals to counterfactuals to explain reference. Fodor's counterfac-
tuals express an asymmetrical dependence between truths of the form 'Xs
cause"cat" tokenings '. In this way, the referent of'cat' is arrived at through a
counterfactual of the form "If cats didn't cause "cat" tokenings, then (.. .)
(cat pictures, cat statues, the sound "meow", and so on) wouldn't cause "cat"
tokenings either" (Purnam 1992, p. 38).
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W h e n D e v i t t d i s c u s s e s c a u s a l r e l a t i o n i t i s w i t h a n e x p l a n a t o r y r o l e I n
m i n d :
S o h i s [ t h e r e a l i s t ' s ] a n s w e r m a y i n c l u d e a s e n t e n c e r o u g h l y l i k e
T e r m x i s c a u s a l l y r e l a t e d i n w a y A t o o b j e c t y a n d t o n o t h i n g e l s e
a s a n e x p l a n a t i o n o f a n o t h e r s e n t e n c e
x r e f e r s t o y a n d t o n o t h i n g e l s e
I n s u c h c i r c u m s t a n c e s h e w i l l r e g a r d t h e r e f e r e n c e o f x a s d e t e r m i n a t e ( 1 9 8 4 , p .
1 8 9 ) .
A g a i n :
W e c o u l d h a v e f o r e r o l d t h a t w e w o u l d b e a b l e t o f i n d s o m e c a u s a l r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n
t h e e n t i t i e s , b e c a u s e c a u s a l r e l a t i o n s a r e u b i q u i t o u s . W c n e e d t o s e c t h e o n e w e h a v e
p i c k e d o u t a s e x p l a n a t o r i l y s p e c i a l ( I 9 8 4 , p . 8 7 ; e m p h a s i s i n o r i g i n a l ) .
T h e m e t a p h y s i c a l r e a l i s t i s c o n c e r n e d t o e s t a b l i s h t h e f o l l o w i n g c h a i n
o f e x p l a n a t i o n . H i s a i m i s t o e x p l a i n t h e s u c c e s s o f s c i e n c e i n t e r m s o f t h e
r e f e r e n c e o f t h e t h e o r i e s o f s c i e n c e t o s u b s e t s o f t h e t o t a l i t y o f a l l o b j e c t s .
H i s r e d u c t i o n i s m , p a r t i c u l a r l y h i s p r e d i l e c t i o n f o r p h y s i c a l i s t i c d e s c r i p -
t i o n , l e a d s h i m t o p u r s u e a n e x p l a n a t i o n o f r e f e r e n c e i n t e r m s o f a c a u s a l r e -
l a t i o n . H o w e v e r , i t i s P u r n a r n ' s c l a i m t h a t n o i n t e l l i g i b l e e x p l a n a t i o n o f t h e
' f a c t s o f l a n g u a g e ' - f o r e x a m p l e , t h a t w e o f t e n a s s e r t ' t h e r e i s a c a s t l e i n
v i e w ' j u s t w h e n t h e r e i s a c a s t l e i n v i e w a n d n o t w h e n a n i g l o o i s i n v i e w -
c a n p r o c e e d i n t h e n o n - i n t e n t i o n a l m a n n e r t y p i c a l o f r e d u c t i o n i s t a n a l y -
s i s I I . A n i n t e l l i g i b l e e x p l a n a t i o n o f r e f e r e n c e m u s t a p p e a l t o a n o t i o n o f
e p i s t e m i c p r i o r i t y , s u c h t h a t t h e e x p l a n a n s - i n t h i s c a s e , a c a u s a l r e l a t i o n - e x -
h i b i t s a g r e a t e r d e g r e e o f s u p p o r t i v e w a r r a n t t h a n t h e e x p l a n a n d u m , h e r e
t h e n o t i o n o f r e f e r e n c e . W a r r a n t p r e s u p p o s e s t h e c o n c e p t o f e v i d e n c e , e v i -
d e n c e w h i c h i s e s s e n t i a l t o t h e c o n f i r m a t i o n o f t h e c a u s a l r e l a t i o n i n t h i s
c o n t e x t . M o r e o v e r , t h e e v i d e n c e i n s u p p o r t o f t h i s c a u s a l r e l a t i o n p r e s u p -
p o s e s t h e s a t i s f a c t i o n o f c e r t a i n s t a n d a r d s o f r e l e v a n c e t o t h a t r e l a t i o n .
R e l e v a n c e i s n o t a n i s o l a t e d n o t i o n , b u t o n e w h i c h i s f u r t h e r d e p e n d e n t o n
t h e c o n c e p t o f m e a n i n g - t o u n d e r s t a n d t h e r e l e v a n c e o f t h e e v i d e n c e o f t h e
p r e s e n t c a s e i s t o u n d e r s t a n d t h e w a y i n w h i c h t h e c o n t e n t o f t h i s e v i d e n c e
b e a r s u p o n t h e c o n t e n t o f t h e c a u s a l r e l a t i o n . I n s h o r t , a p a t t e r n o f i n t e r r e l a -
t i o n s h i p s c a n b e s h o w n t o e x i s t f o r a r a n g e o f s u c h e p i s r e r n i c a n d n o r m a t i v e
n o t i o n s , a p a t t e r n w h i c h c o n s t i t u t e s a c o m p l e x n e t w o r k o f t h e s e d i f f e r e n t
c o n c e p t s .
H o w e v e r , i t i s j u s t t h e s e n o r m a t i v e a n d c p i s r e r n i c n o t i o n s w h i c h a r e u n -
a v a i l a b l e t o t h e c a u s a l t h e o r i s t . H e i s p u r s u i n g a r e d u c r i o n i s t a n a l y s i s - a n
a c c o u n t o f t h e i n t e n t i o n a l f r o m w i t h i n t h e n o n - i n t e n t i o n a l - a n e s s e n t i a l f e a -
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ture of which is its rejection of all things normative. With this rejection of
norrnarivity and of the episrernic concepts described above comes the
causalist's failure to provide an intelligible explanation of reference. For we
cannot even make sense of an explanation which , by its very nature, resists
description in terms of relevance, epistemic priority, and so on. The dia-
lectical significance of explanation in this context stems from its role in
Purnam's charge of selfrefutation against the causalist. That charge results
from Purnam's application of the causal theorist's claims to a statement of
the causal theorist's own position. In this way, if it is true that reference is
(explained by) a causal relation, then at the very least a causal relation
should be capable of explaining the referential nature of that fact. However,
we have just seen the Utopian nature of such a demand -no causal relation
that is acceptable to the causalist can assume the essentially intentional
character of explanation. Yet causal theories must achieve exactly this much
if they are to continue in their role as an explanation of reference. For Pur-
nam, the sense in which causal theories are self-refuting is that in order to
explain the reference of the claim 'reference is (explained by) a causal rel a-
tion', the causalist must appeal to a notion of explanation which exceeds
description by a causal relation. In this way, reference cannot be (explained
by) a causal relation. Hence, it is false that reference is (explained by) a
causal relation . The causalist is confronted with the following option. He
can either conclude that his causal theory, lacking as it is in normative re-
sources , fails as an explanation of the referential relation of the aforemen-
tioned fact. Or he can successfully pursue an explanation of the referential
nature of this fact, but in doing so he is substituting a theory which differs
significantly from the causal one he wishes to advance.
In 1994, Purnam delivered the Dewey Lectures (Purnarn, 1994b). These
lectures represented Purnarn's most explicit formulation of the motivation
for the reductionism of causal theories of reference and, a fortiori, of
metaphysical realism itself (I say his most explicit formulation because
for a number of years prior to his presentation of the Dewey Lectures, Put-
nam had effectively been locating the source of the urge to reduce inten-
tionality in an interface conception of mind. For example, in The Many
Faces ofRealism Purnam remarks
This is th e famous picture, [he duali stic picture of the phy sical world and its pri-
mary qual ities, on [he one hand . and [he mind and its sense data, on the other, that
philosophers have been wrangling over since the time of Gal ileo, as H usserl says.
And it is Husserl's idea -as it was the idea of Will iam jarnes, who influenced
Huss erl- that this picture is disastrous (1987, pp. 6-7) ).
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F o r P u t n a m , c a u s a l t h e o r i e s a r e f o u n d e d u p o n t h e m i s t a k e n a s s u m p t i o n t h a t
t h e f a c t s o f v a r i o u s s c i e n t i f i c d i s c i p l i n e s , b e t h e y h a r d o r s o f t i n n a t u r e ,
h a v e a n i n f o r m a t i v e l i g h t t o s h e d o n w h a t h a s t r a d i t i o n a l l y b e e n d e s c r i b e d
a s t h e p r o b l e m o f i n t e n t i o n a l i t y . W i t h t h e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f h i s D e w e y L e c -
t u r e s , P u t n a r n a t t e m p t e d t o a r t i c u l a t e f u r t h e r h i s d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n w i t h t h e
m e t a p h y s i c a l r e a l i s t ' s p o s i t i o n . T h e f o c u s o f h i s a t t e n t i o n a t t h i s t i m e
s h i f t e d f r o m t h e s c i e n t i f i c r e d u c t i o n i s r n w h i c h m o t i v a t e s m e t a p h y s i c a l r e -
a l i s m a n d t h e c a u s a l i s t r e s p o n s e t o t h e i n d e t e r m i n a c y o f r e f e r e n c e , t o t h e
q u e s t i o n o f w h y i t s e e m s t h a t a r e d u c r i o n i s t a p p r o a c h i s t h e o n l y s e r i o u s
c o n t e n d e r w h e n o u r i n q u i r i e s t u r n t o p r o b l e m s i n t h e p h i l o s o p h y o f m i n d .
O f c o u r s e , e l i m i n a t i v i s t s 1 2 l i k e S r e p h e n S t i c h a n d R i c h a r d R o r t y w o u l d
d e n y s u c h a c l a i m - f o r t h e s e w r i t e r s , i n t e n t i o n a l n o t i o n s I i k e r e f e r e n c e a n d
r e a s o n c a n s i m p l y b e e l i m i n a t e d . H o w e v e r , i t i s P u r n a r n ' s c l a i m t h a t w h a t
m o t i v a t e s t h e c a s e o f r e d u c t i o n i s r n - w h a t P u t n a m , f o H o w i n g J o h n M c D o w -
e l l , h a s d e s c r i b e d a s a n i n t e r f a c e c o n c e p t i o n o f m i n d - s i m i l a r l y m o t i v a t e s
t h e c a s e o f e l i m i n a t i v i s m . I n d e e d , o n c e o n e h a s a c c e p t e d a n i n t e r f a c e c o n -
c e p t i o n o f m i n d , t h e n o n e m u s t e i t h e r p r o c e e d b y r e d u c i n g i n t e n t i o n a l i t y
o r e x p l a i n i n g i n t e n t i o n a l i t y a w a y . .
T o s e e t h i s , c o n s i d e r h o w r e f e r e n c e i s a c c o u n t e d f o r w i t h i n a n i n t e r f a c e
c o n c e p t i o n o f m i n d . I n h i s D e w e y L e c t u r e s , P u t n a m ( l 9 9 4 b ) a r g u e s :
E a r l y m o d e r n r e a l i s m ' s p h i l o s o p h y o f m i n d w a s a n a t t e m p t t o s a v e s o m e r o o m f o r
o u r e v e r y d a y d e s c r i p t i o n s w h i l e f u l l y a c c e p t i n g [ t h e i d e a t h a t o u r e v e r y d a y d e s c r i p -
t i o n s c a n n o t p o s s i b l y a p p l y t o t h e t h i n g s " a s t h e y a r e i n t h e m s e l v e s " ] . A c c o r d i n g t o
t h i s n e w p h i l o s o p h y o f m i n d , o u r " e x p e r i e n c e " i s e n t i r e l y a m a t t e r t a k i n g p l a c e
w i t h i n t h e m i n d ( o r w i t h i n t h e b r a i n ) , w i t h i n , t h a t i s t o s a y , a r e a l m c o n c e i v e d 0 f
a s " i n s i d e " , a r e a l m w h e r e t h e r e a r c c e r t a i n l y n o t a b l e s a n d c h a i r s o r c a b b a g e s o r
k i n g s , a r e a l m s o d i s j o i n t f r o m w h a t c a m e t o b e c a l l e d t h e " e x t e r n a l " w o r l d t h a t ( a s
B e r k e l e y i n s i s t e d ) i t m a k e s n o s e n s e t o s p e a k o f a n y e x p e r i e n c e a s r e s e m b l i n g w h a t
t h e e x p e r i e n c e i s " o f ' . N e v e r t h e l e s s , a c c o r d i n g t o t h o s e p h i l o s o p h e r s w h o w e r e n o t
w i l l i n g t o f o l l o w B e r k e l e y i n t o i d e a l i s m , " e x t e r n a l " t h i n g s a r e t h e c a u s es o f o u r
" i n n e r " e x p e r i e n c e s , a n d , w h i l e t h e p e r s o n o n t h e s t r e e t i s m i s t a k e n i n t h i n k i n g t h a t
h e o r s h e " d i r e c t l y p e r c e i v e s " t h o s e t h i n g s , s t i l l w e " i n d i r e c t l y p e r c e i v e " t h e m , i n
t h e s e n s e o f h a v i n g e x p e r i e n c e s c a u s e d b y t h e m . M o r e o v e r , e v e n c o l o r a n d w a r m t h
a n d t h e o t h e r " s e c o n d a r y q u a l i t i e s " ( a s t h e y c a m e t o b e c a l l e d ) c a n b e g r a n t e d a d e -
r i v a t i v e s o r t o f r e a l i t y - r h c y d o n o t e x i s t a s " i n t r i n s i c p r o p e r t i e s " o f t h e t h i n g s " i n
t h e m s e l v e s " , b u t t h e y e x i s t a s " r e l a t i o n a l p r o p e r t i e s " , a s d i s p o s i t i o n s t o a f f e c t o u r
m i n d s ( o r b r a i n s ) i n c e r t a i n w a y s ( p p . 4 6 8 - 4 6 9 ; e m p h a s e s i n o r i g i n a l ) .
I n t h e a b o v e p a s s a g e P u t n a r n d e s c r i b e s a t y p e o f p h i l o s o p h i c a l ' s o l u t i o n '
t o t h e ' p r o b l e m ' o f e x p l a i n i n g t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p o f p e r c e p t u a l e x p e r i e n c e s t o
t h e p h y s i c a l w o r l d . D A l t h o u g h s e v e n t e e n t h c e n t u r y i n o r i g i n , t h i s s a m e ' s o -
l u t i o n ' e f f e c t i v e l y e x h a u s t s t h e t y p e o f e x p l a n a t i o n t h a t i s t r a d e d w i t h i n
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present-day philosophical accounts of intentionality. For while it is gener-
ally held that we can explain our perceptual interaction with the world us-
ing some suitably formulated causal mechanism, a similar mechanism is
presumed to operate within our talk of thoughts referring to features of re-
ality. Moreover, as part of these accounts it is argued that these causal rela-
tions (1) bridge the gulf brought about by the dualist's dichotomy of the
mental and the physical (a gulf over which our conceptual powers cannot
extend) and (2) secure a type of objectivity, in that both perceptual experi-
ence and the referential capacity of language are not the products of some
fanciful creation on our part, but are ultimately 'caused' by an external
world . Indeed, it is by virtue of these causal relations that we can assign
content to our thoughts and perceptual experiences -outside of these rela-
tions, thoughts and experiences are taken to exhibit syntactic structure only.
Purnarn describes the varied nature of this interface of perception and con-
ception as follows:
In the tradition, th ese "interfaces" (. ..) were o rigina lly thought of as mental (...) It
is not, however, essential to an interface conception of either perception or concep-
tion that the interface be 'mental -in materialist versions, the interface can be a
bra in process or brain state. In Quine's versi on of the int erface conception of per-
ception, it is nerve endings on the surface of my body that play th e role of th e inter-
face. In the case of conception , the interface has recently been conceived of as con-
sisting o f "m arks and noises" (Rorty): although the interface is nor literally "in-
side" us o n th is Rorrian conception, it (Urns out to generate the same problem atic
"gap" between thought and the world. (T here is also a versi on -Fodor's- in which
the interface is sentences, bur nor sentences in a public language -marks and noises-
but in a language "insid e" our brains, "rnentalese". This is a kind of combination
of the linguistic conception of th e interface with the conception of the interface as
"in side the head" ). (Unpublished lecture notes) .
Within an interface conception of mind our cognitive powers extend as
far as an interface which is variously represented by sense data, qualia or, if
your interests are Quinean in nature, by the stimulation of the body's sur-
face neurons. In general, everything enclosed by this interface is of one
kind , a strictly mental realm, and everything beyond the interface is of a
quite different kind, phys ical relations devoid of all intentional character.
According to one version of this picture, that advanced by Jerry .Fodor, in
order to explain how our thoughts can be about anything, one must first as-
sume the existence of syntactically characterised structures, mental entities
described in terms of their syntactic components. To this one must add a
semantics, physical relations which uniquely determine the truth-values of
each of the previously specified syntactic structures. It is by means of a re-
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d u c t i o n t o t h e s e p h y s i c a l r e l a t i o n s t h a t t h e c a u s a l i s t p r o p o s e s t o e x p l a i n
r e f e r e n c e . T h e e 1 i m i n a t i v i s t , s c e p t i c a l o f t h e p r o s p e c t o f a s u c c e s s f u l o u t -
c o m e t o t h i s r e d u c t i o n i s t p r o j e c t , p u r s u e s a n e l i m i n a t i o n o f i n t e n t i o n a l i t y
i t s e l f , M o t i v a t i n g b o t h r e s p o n s e s i n t h i s c o n t e x t i s t h e n o t i o n o f a n i n t e r f a c e
b e t w e e n a n i n n e r m e n t a l r e a l m a n d a n o u t e r p h y s i c a l w o r l d , a n i n t e r f a c e
w h i c h i s b r i d g e d b y a c o m p l e t e r e d u c t i o n o f t h e m e n t a l t o t h e p h y s i c a l i n
t h e c a s e o f r e d u c t i o n i s m a n d w h i c h i s e x p l a i n e d a w a y a l o n g w i t h i n t e n t i o n -
a l i t y i n t h e c a s e o f e l i r n i n a r i v i s m .
T h i s i n t e r f a c e c o n c e p t i o n o f o u r c o g n i t i v e f u n c t i o n i n g h a s b e e n , a n d c o n -
t i n u e s t o b e , e n o r m o u s l y i n f l u e n t i a l , s o m u c h s o t h a t , a s P u t n a m h a s a r g u e d ,
i t c a n c o m e t o s e e m l i k e ' p o s t - s c i e n t i f i c c o m m o n s e n s e ' , N o t w i t h s t a n d i n g
t h e a p p e a l o f t h i s p i c t u r e , t h e i n t e r f a c e c o n c e p t i o n o f m i n d i s i n h e r e n t l y u n -
i n t e l l i g i b l e . I t s u n i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y s t e m s f r o m a c e r t a i n m e t a p h y s i c a l s t a n d -
p o i n t , o n e w h i c h a s s u m e s t h a t w e c a n c o m p a r e t h o u g h t a n d " l a n g u a g e w i t h
r e a l i t y i n i t s e l f . F o r P u t n a r n , t h e n o t i o n o f a m i n d - i n d e p e n d e n t r e a l i t y , a
r e a l i t y d e s c r i b e d ' i n i t s e l f w i t h o u t t h e p r e s u p p o s i t i o n o f c o n c e p t s , i s q u i t e
s i m p l y u n i n t e l l i g i b l e I 4 . T h a t n o t i o n a n d t h e s t a n d p o i n t w h i c h g e n e r a t e s i t
w e r e a l r e a d y u n d e r c h a l l e n g e i n T h e M a n y F a ce s o f R e a l i s m o n t h e g r o u n d s
o f t h e i r u n i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y . I n t h a t t e x t , P u t n a r n r e j e c t s t h e t r a d i t i o n a l r e a l i s t
a s s u m p t i o n s o f ( 1 ) a f i x e d t o t a l i t y o f a l l o b j e c t s ; ( 2 ) a f i x e d t o t a l i t y o f a l l
p r o p e r t i e s ; ( 3 ) a s h a r p l i n e b e t w e e n p r o p e r t i e s ' w e " d i s c o v e r " i n t h e w o r l d
a n d p r o p e r t i e s w e " p r o j e c t " o n t o t h e w o r l d ; ( 4 ) a f i x e d r e l a t i o n o f " c o r r e -
s p o n d e n c e " i n t e r m s o f w h i c h t r u t h i s s u p p o s e d t o b e d e f i n e d . E a c h o f t h e s e
a s s u m p t i o n s , P u t n a m a r g u e s , p r e s u p p o s e s t h a t w e c a n g i v e s o m e s e n s e t o t h e
n o t i o n o f a r e a l i t y i n i t s e l f , a r e a l i t y w h i c h c a n b e f i n i t e l y d e s c r i b e d i n t h e
l a n g u a g e o f m a t h e m a t i c a l p h y s i c s ( P u r n a r n d e s c r i b e s h o w H u s s e r l d e -
s c r i b e s " t h e i d e a o f t h e ' e x t e r n a l w o r l d ' a s s o m e t h i n g w h o s e t r u e d e s c r i p -
t i o n , w h o s e d e s c r i p t i o n ' i n i t s e l f , c o n s i s t s o f m a t h e m a t i c a l f o r m u l a s " a s
" w h a t a b o v e a l l c a m e i n t o W e s t e r n t h i n k i n g w i t h t h e G a l i l e a n r e v o l u t i o n "
( 1 9 8 7 , p , 5 » .
H o w e v e r , t h e p r o b l e m w i t h s u c h a p r e s u p p o s i t i o n c a n b e s e e n a s s o o n a s
w e a t t e m p t t o c h a r a c t e r i s e t h e p r o p e r t i e s w h i c h s u p p o s e d l y c o n s t i t u t e a r e -
a l i t y i n i t s e l f . F o r e v e n p r o p e r t i e s s u c h a s s o l u b i l i t y , w h i c h w e r e t r a d i t i o n -
a l l y c o n c e i v e d a s b e i n g t h e " i n t r i n s i c ' p r o p e r t i e s o f ' e x t e r n a l ' t h i n g s ' , c a n b e
s h o w n t o f a i l o f a n y f i n i t e c h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n i n t h e l a n g u a g e o f m a t h e m a t i c a l
p h y s i c s a n d c a n n o t , f o r t h i s r e a s o n , b e d e s c r i b e d a s p a r t o f a r e a l i t y i n i t -
s e l f :
I f t h e ' i n t r i n s i c ' p r o p e r t i e s o f ' e x t e r n a l ' t h i n g s a r e t h e o n e s t h a t w c c a n r e p r e s e n t b y
f o r m u l a s i n t h e l a n g u a g e o f f u n d a m e n t a l p h y s i c s , b y ' s u i t a b l e f u n c t i o n s o f t h e d y -
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namical variables', then solubility is also not an 'intrinsic' property of any external
thing (Purnam 1987, p. 11; emphasis in original).
In the present context, what appears to the causalist to be the possibility
of a reality in itself motivates his attempt to explain reference in terms of
a causal relation. For the essential feature of a causal relation, at least this
is how it appears to the causalist, is that it, like the notion of a reality in it-
self, exists apart from all conceptual schemes and can be described ulti-
mately in the language of fundamental physics. However, if the project of
reducing solubility to the language of fundamental physics has failed, then
the vastly more complicated project of reducing reference to the language
of fundamental physics -the physical descriptions of causal relations- is
also doomed to failure. A fortiori, in the same way that it is unintelligible
to talk of a reality in itself -we cannot so much as make sense of a notion
which, by its very nature, resists capture by concepts- it is unintelligible to
talk of a non-intentional causal relation -ir is the intentional notions that
the causal theorist wishes to set apart from his causal theory of reference
that effectively confer sense on the causal relations that are central to that
theory. Moreover, it is not a solution to this particular set of problems to
say that we cannotcompare thought and language with reality in itself. For
in employing the notion of a reality in itself, this negative thesis falls foul
of the same unintelligibility from which it is intended to be an escape. For
Putnarn, a way through this impasse is to be found in Wittgenstein. As
lames Conant has argued in the introduction to Putnarn's Words and Life:
The readings of (both early and later) Wittgenstein which Purnam (now) wishes to
take issue with are all readings which understand Wirrgenstein to be calling upon
us to acknowledge the existence of certain limits (the limits imposed on thought by
the logical structure of language, or the limits imposed on knowledge by the con-
tingent nature of our forms of life). Wirrgenstein (according to the readings Put-
nam opposes) shows us how to acquiesce in -rather than chafe against- these limits.
Most of the readings of Wirrgenstein which are presently in circulation (however
much they may otherwise differ from one another) are of this variety, counselling
us to resign ourselves to our inability to transcend the conditions of human knowl-
edge. The readings of Wingenstein's Tractatus and Philosophical Investigations that
Purnam himself (now) urges are ones which take Wirrgenstein to be concerned to
show that the limit against which, in our philosophizing, we (imagine ourselves
to) chafe is an illusory limit. On this reading of Wittgenstein (...) "we cannot
know the world as it is 'in itself' (...) not because the 'in itself' is an unreachable
limit, but because the 'in itself' doesn't make sense" (1994a, p. xl: emphasis in
original).
Conant's use of the expression 'our philosophizing' is significant in this
context. Its significance stems from what Cora Diamond, Putnarn and
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W i t t g e n s t e i n a l l s e e a s w h a t b e c o m e s o f o u r c o n c e p t s u n d e r t h e p r e s s u r e o f
d o i n g p h i l o s o p h y . I n a n a t t e m p t t o u n d e r s t a n d t h e e f f e c t s o f t h i s p r e s s u r e ,
P u t n a m h a s d r a w n u p o n t h e i n s i g h t s o f A m e r i c a n p r a g m a t i s m , t h e p r i n c i p a l
a p p e a l o f w h i c h , i n h i s o p i n i o n , h a s b e e n a n e m p h a s i s o n t h e p r i m a c y o f
p r a c t i c e . J u s t s u c h a n e m p h a s i s i s a t t h e h e a r t o f P u t n a m ' s p r a g m a t i c ( i n t e r -
n a l ) r e a l i s m I 5 ( a f u r t h e r f e a t u r e o f t h i s r e a l i s m , i t s e m p h a s i s o n c o m m o n -
s e n s e r e a l i s m , w i l l b e d e s c r i b e d s u b s e q u e n t l y ) . T h e w a y s o f t a l k i n g a n d
t h i n k i n g w h i c h a r e f u n d a m e n t a l t o o u r p r a c t i c e s g i v e r i s e t o p i c t u r e s , p i c -
t u r e s w h i c h c a n a l l t o o e a s i l y b e c o m e t h e s o u r c e o f m u c h m e t a p h y s i c s i n
p h i l o s o p h y . I n d e m o n s t r a t i o n o f t h i s , c o n s i d e r t h e c a s e o f o u r ' u s i n g a p i c -
t u r e ' a n d t h e c a s e o f o u r ' b e i n g i n t h e g r i p o f a p i c t u r e ' . T h e f o r m e r i s t h e
c o n c e r n o f D i a m o n d ' s r e a l i s t i c s p i r i t , a s p i r i t w h i c h a i m s t o r e c o v e r t h e
r o l e t h a t v a r i o u s c o n c e p t s p l a y i n o u r l i v e s . T h e l a t t e r i s t h e w o r k o f t h e
m e t a p h y s i c a l s p i r i t , t h e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a c t i v i t y o f w h i c h i s a l a y i n g d o w n o f
m e t a p h y s i c a l r e q u i r e m e n t s a b o u t w h a t m u s t b e t h e c a s e i n o r d e r f o r s o m e -
t h i n g - r e f e r e n c e , d e t e r m i n a c y o f s e n s e , k n o w l e d g e o f o t h e r m i n d s , a n d s o
o n - t o b e p o s s i b l e . T h e s a t i s f a c t i o n o f t h e s e r e q u i r e m e n t s r e s u l t s i n a n i n -
e v i t a b l e d i s t o r t i o n o f t h e v e r y c o n c e p t s t h a t w e a r e s e e k i n g t o u n d e r s t a n d .
T h i s s a m e d i s t o r t i o n c o n t i n u e s t o h a u n t t h e e n d e a v o u r s o f t h o s e w h o w i s h t o
e s c a p e f r o m m e t a p h y s i c a l r e a l i s m . S u c h i s P u r n a r n ' s c r i t i c i s m o f R o r r y ' s
a t t e m p t t o a b a n d o n n o t i o n s l i k e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n .
R o r t y w a s c o n t e n t a t a t i m e t o e x p r e s s h i s d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n w i t h m e t a -
p h y s i c a l r e a l i s m i n t e r m s o f t h e u n i n t e l l i g i b i l i r y o f t h e m e t a p h y s i c a l r e a l -
i s t ' s c l a i m s . I n a 1 9 9 3 p a p e r e n t i t l e d ' P u t n a m a n d t h e R e l a t i v i s t M e n a c e ' ,
R o r r y r e j e c t e d h i s e a r l i e r c r i t i c i s m c o n c e r n i n g t h e u n i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y o f w h a t
i t w o u l d b e t o r e p r e s e n t t h e w o r l d a s i t i s , i n f a v o u r o f w h a t h e d e s c r i b e d a s
t h e r e l a t i v e i n u t i l i t y o f s u c h a c l a i m . F o r P u t n a m , R o r r y ' s c h a r g e o f r e l a t i v e
i n u t i l i t y i s t h e e x p r e s s i o n o f a d e s i r e t o a v o i d a l l f u r t h e r e x a m i n a t i o n o f
t h e k i n d o f f a i l u r e e v i d e n t i n t h e c a s e o f m e t a p h y s i c a l r e a l i s m . R o r t y , i n
s h i f t i n g t h e f o c u s o f h i s c r i t i c i s m f r o m t h e u n i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y t o t h e r e l a t i v e
i n u t i l i t y o f m e t a p h y s i c a l r e a l i s m , r e m a i n s b l i n d t o t h e h y p e r b o l i c a l s t a n -
d a r d s o f c e r t a i n t y t h a t t h e m e t a p h y s i c a l s p i r i t i m p o s e s o n o u r c o n c e p t s .
T h e s e m e t a p h y s i c a l l y s u b l i m e d c o u n t e r p a r t s o f o u r c o n c e p t s m i m i c t h e
g r a m m a r o f o r d i n a r y c o n c e p t s w h i l e d r a i n i n g t h e m o f t h e i r c o n t e n t . F o r
R o r t y , a r e t r e a t i n t o s c e p t i c i s m a p p e a r s i n e v i t a b l e g i v e n t h e f a i l u r e o f
m e t a p h y s i c a l r e a l i s m t o a d e q u a t e l y a c c o u n t f o r r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . H o w e v e r ,
t h i s r e t r e a t i s c h a r a c t e r i s e d b y t h e s a m e u n i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y f r o m w h i c h i t i s
a n a t t e m p t t o e s c a p e . R o r t y a p p e a r s t o o p e r a t e w i t h t h e a s s u m p t i o n t h a t i f
t h e m e t a p h y s i c a l r e a l i s t f a i l s t o a c c o u n t f o r r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , t h e n o u r w o r d s
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simply do not represent anything. He fails to see that even in his scepti-
cism, he is allowing the metaphysical realist to hold the concept of repre-
sentation hostage to certain metaphysically inflated standards. It is in this
sense that Putnam takes the thesis and counter-thesis of a dispute to share
similar presuppositions, the unintelligibility of which is his reason for re-
maining uncommitted to both types of claim. What emerges from these
considerations is that to truly overcome metaphysical realism and, also,
vatism, we must begin by recovering the ordinary concepts of language.
It is part of Purnarn's own attempt at recovery -whar he has described as
a common-sense realism and a "deliberate" or "second naivete" about con-
ception- that he would have us take seriously the teachings of Wittgenstein.
Sections 25 and 95 of Philosophical Investigations typify the picture that
Putnam has in mind:
Commanding, questioning , recounting, charring, are as much a part of our natural
history as walking, eating, drinking, playing (25)
when we say, and mean, that such-and-such is the case, we -and our meaning- do not
stop anywhere short of the fact; but we mean this-is-so (95)
Much of the necessary groundwork for this picture -and I use the term
'picture' to distinguish what I have to say from a fully developed philo-
sophical view I6• is already in place. It was described above how meta-
physical realism was rejected not on the basis of its falsity, but rather on
account of what was described as its dependence on the unintelligible na-
tion of a reality 'in itself . Just such a rejection forms the cornerstone of
Purnarn's common-sense realism:
(...) it is a view that takes our famil iar common-sense scheme, as well as our scien-
tific and artistic and other schemes, at face value, without helping itself to the notion
ofthe thing 'in itself (1987, p. 17; emphasis added) .
What gave this idea of a reality 'in itself an initial degree of plausibil-
ity was the thought that we could assume a certain metaphysical stand-
point. Under the influence of the metaphysical spirit we all too readily
conceived of our epistemological standpoint in the world as akin to that of
a God's Eye point of view, that is, as a metaphysical standpoint out of the
world. It was further argued that it was central to the workings of the
metaphysical spirit that concepts SUd1 as reference and representation 00-
derwent a type of inflation, the effect of which was to distort the applica-
tions of those notions within ordinary language. In fact, the idea of an out-
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o f - t h e - w o r l d m e t a p h y s i c a l s t a n d p o i n t a n d t h e i d e a o f t h e m e t a p h y s i c a l i n -
f l a t i o n o f c o n c e p t s a r e i n t i m a t e l y l i n k e d . F o r t h e l e v e l o f c e r t a i n t y w h i c h
t h e m e t a p h y s i c a l s p i r i t d e m a n d s o f u s a n d w h i c h u l t i m a t e l y b e c o m e s a n
i n t e g r a l p a r t o f c o n c e p t s t h e m s e l v e s , i s o n l y a t t a i n a b l e f r o m a G o d ' s E y e
p o i n t o f v i e w .
T h e m e t a p h y s i c a l s p i r i t u r g e s u s t o p r o c e e d i n o u r p h i l o s o p h i s i n g b y
c o n s i d e r i n g c o n c e p t s a p a r t f r o m t h e i r a p p l i c a t i o n s i n t h e d i f f e r e n t d o m a i n s
o f o u r l i v e s . W h e n w e d o e v e n t u a l l y s e t a b o u t e x a m i n i n g t h e i r a p p l i c a t i o n s ,
w e c a n o n l y s e e t h e s e c o n c e p t s t h r o u g h a l e n s o f m e t a p h y s i c a l l y i m p o s e d
s t a n d a r d s . A s J a m e s C o n a n t h a s r e m a r k e d , " T h i s i s o n e w a y i n t o m e t a p h y s -
i c s " ( P u t n a m , 1 9 9 4 a , p . l i i i ) . T o o v e r c o m e t h e d o m i n a t i o n t h a t t h e m e t a -
p h y s i c a l s p i r i t h a s o v e r u s a n d , i n s o d o i n g , f i n d a w a y b a c k o u t o f m e t a -
p h y s i c s , w e m u s t f i r s t r e v e r s e t h e o r d e r o f t h i s e x a m i n a t i o n , a t a s k w h i c h i s
t h e c o n c e r n o f t h e r e a l i s t i c s p i r i t . T h e r e a l i s t i c s p i r i t e n c o u r a g e s u s t o b e g i n
b y l o o k i n g a n d s e e i n g j u s t h o w c o n c e p t s a r e a p p l i e d w i t h i n o u r v a r i o u s
p r a c t i c e s . T h i s r e q u i r e s t h a t w e e n g a g e i n a p r o c e s s o f d e s c r i p t i o n , t h e a i m
o f w h i c h i s a n a c c u r a t e c h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n o f t h e c o n s e q u e n c e s t h a t a p a r t i c u l a r
p i c r u r e , a n d t h e c o n c e p t s i n h e r e n t i n i t , h a s f o r i t s u s e r . I n h i s L e c t u r e s o n
R e l i g i o u s B e l i e f , W i t t g e n s t e i n d e s c r i b e s t h e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s t h a t a r e s u b -
s u m e d w i t h i n t h i s t y p e o f d e s c r i p t i o n :
" G o d ' s e y e s e e s e v e r y t h i n g " - I w a n t r o s a y o f t h i s t h a t i t u s e s a p i c t u r e .
I d o n ' t w a n t r o b e l i t t l e . . . t h e p e r s o n w h o s a y s i t . . .
W e a s s o c i a t e a p a r t i c u l a r u s e w i t h a p i c t u r e . . .
W h a t c o n c l u s i o n s a r e y o u g o i n g r o d r a w ? . . . A r e e y e b r o w s g o i n g t o b e t a l k e d o f , i n
c o n n e c t i o n w i t h t h e E y e o f G o d ? . .
I f I s a y h e u s e d a p i c t u r e , I d o n ' t w a n t r o s a y a n y t h i n g h e h i r n s e l f w o u l d n ' t s a y . I
w a n t t o s a y h e d r a w s t h e s e c o n c l u s i o n s .
I s n ' t i t a s i m p o r t a n t a s a n y t h i n g e l s e , w h a t p i c t u r e h e d o e s u s e ? . . .
T h e w h o l e w e i g h t m a y b e i n t h e p i c t u r e . . . W h e n I s a y h e ' s u s i n g a p i c t u r e , I a m
m e r e l y m a k i n g a g r a m m a t i c a l r e m a r k : [ W h a t I s a y ] c a n o n l y b e v e r i f i e d b y t h e c o n -
s e q u e n c e s h e d o e s o r d o e s n o r d r a w . . .
A l l I w i s h e d r o c h a r a c t e r i s e w a s t h e c o n s e q u e n c e s h e w i s h e d r o d r a w . I f I w i s h e d r o
s a y a n y t h i n g m o r e I w a s m e r e l y b e i n g p h i l o s o p h i c a l l y a r r o g a n t ( p p . 7 1 - 7 2 ) .
T h e m o s t o u t s t a n d i n g f e a t u r e o f t h i s d e s c r i p t i v e p r o c e s s i s t h e r e s t r i c -
t i o n s p l a c e d o n t h e e x t e n t o f t h e d e s c r i p t i o n . W i t t g e n s t e i n d o e s n ' t w a n t t o
s a y a n y t h i n g h e [ t h e u s e r o f t h e p i c t u r e ] h i m s e l f w o u l d n ' t s a y ; i n d e e d , t o
s a y m o r e i s ' b e i n g p h i l o s o p h i c a l l y a r r o g a n t ' . I n f a c t , t o s a y m o r e i s t o p r o -
c e e d t o p h i l o s o p h i s e i n t h e m a n n e r u r g e d b y t h e m e t a p h y s i c a l s p i r i t , a
m a n n e r i n w h i c h w e d e s c r i b e t h e a p p l i c a t i o n o f a p i c t u r e t h r o u g h a n u n d e r -
s t a n d i n g o f t h a t s a m e p i c t u r e i n i s o l a t i o n f r o m i t s a p p l i c a t i o n s . U n d e r t h e
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influence of the metaphysical spirit, we inevitably go forward by erecting
standards about what must be the case in order for our thoughts to represent
(refer to) reality. The typical manifestation of these standards is in the
form of a philosophical theory, thus explaining Putnam's concern that 'what
he is offering should not be taken for a philosophical theory in the tradi-
tional sense'.
In relation to the issue of reference, the realistic spirit encourages us to
see that there is no problem of how our words and sentences can refer ro
(represent) entities and states of affairs in the external world. Representing
the world around us through thought and language is an activity comparable
to a vast number of other activities and requires no special metaphysical re-
lation, such as a causal relation, to underwrite it l ? An accurate description
of this activity involves us in an examination of the many and varied ways
in which the world is represented in science, in art and in a range of other
areas of human concern. Moreover, an accurate description of representation
requires us to reconceptualise the very medium -Ianguage- through which
representation is achieved. As Purnam remarks:
When we know and use a language well, when it becomes the vehicle of our own
thinking and not something we have to translate mentally into some more famil-
iar language, we do not, pace Richard Rorry, experience its words and sentences as
"marks and noises" into which a significance has to be read. When we hear a sen-
tence in a language we understand, we do not associate a sense with a sign-design; we
perceive the sense in the sign-design. Sentences that I think, and even sentences that I
hear or read , simply do refer to whatever they are about; not because the "marks and
noises" that I see and hear (or hear "in my head ", in the case of my own thoughts) in-
trinsically have the meanings they have, but because the sentence in use is not JUSt a
bunch of "marks and noises" (I 994b, p. 491 ; emphasis in or iginal) .
Language within a common-sense realism is not a syntactic structure to
which an interpretation must be added ('we do not associate a sense with a
sign-design'); indeed, it is only when we dispense with this interface con-
ception of language and representation, without dispensing with the notion
of representation itself, that we can be said to have truly captured the es-
sence of Putnarn's common-sense realism:
But there is an alternative, as more than one philosopher has recently pointed out -
namely, to distinguish carefully berween the activity of "representation" (as some-
thing in wh ich we engage) and the idea of a "representation" as an interface be-
rween ourselves and what we think about, and to understand that giving up the idea
of representations as interfaces requiring a "semantics" is not the same thing as giv-
ing up on the whole idea of representation . (Purnam 1994b, p. 505; emphasis in
original) .
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W i t h t h e r e j e c t i o n o f a n i n t e r f a c e c o n c e p t i o n o f l a n g u a g e c o m e s t h e d i s -
s o l u t i o n o f e v e n t h e a p p e a r a n c e o f a p r o b l e m o f h o w t h o u g h t a n d l a n g u a g e
c a n r e p r e s e n t ( r e f e r t o ) t h e w o r l d . T h a t p r o b l e m a p p e a r e d t o b e v e r y r e a l
i n t h e c o n t e x t o f P u t n a m ' s m o d e l - t h e o r e t i c a r g u m e n t - i t s e e m e d t h a t w e
n e e d e d t o o f f e r s o m e t y p e o f e x p l a n a t i o n ( e . g , a c a u s a l e x p l a n a t i o n ) o f h o w
l a n g u a g e c o u l d d e t e r m i n a t e l y r e f e r t o t h e w o r l d a s a w a y o u t o f t h e c o n c l u -
s i o n o f r e f e r e n t i a l i n d e t e r m i n a c y t h a t w a s d e m o n s t r a t e d b y t h a t a r g u m e n t .
H o w e v e r , a s o n e w r i t e r - B a s v a n F r a a s s e n - h a s s h o w n , b y i n s t i t u t i n g i n t h e
p l a c e o f t h e c o n c e p t i o n o f l a n g u a g e t h a t i s c e n t r a l t o t h e m o d e l - t h e o r e t i c
a r g u m e n t ( t h i s c o n c e p t i o n i s e f f e c t i v e l y a n i n t e r f a c e c o n c e p t i o n
1 8
) , a ' u s e
c o n c e p t i o n o f l a n g u a g e ' , t h e q u e s t i o n o f h o w l a n g u a g e c a n d e t e r r n i n a r e l y r e -
f e r t o t h e w o r l d i s n o n e o t h e r t h a n a ' p s e u d o p r o b l e m ' :
I w i l l o f f e r a d i f f e r e n t w a y t o l o o k a t P u r n a m ' s m o d e l t h e o r e t i c a r g u m e n t . I f w e
i n s i s t o n d i s c u s s i n g l a n g u a g e s o l e l y i n t e r m s o f a r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n w o r d s a n d
t h i n g s , w e m a y w e l l b e f o r c e d i n t o a m e t a p h y s i c a l r e a l i s t p o i n t o f v i e w , o n p a i n 0 f
p a r a d o x . B u t o n t h e l e v e l o f p r a g m a t i c s , i n a d i s c u s s i o n o f l a n g u a g e t h a t a l s o a d -
d r e s s e s t h e r o l e s o f u s e r a n d u s e , t h e a i r o f p a r a d o x d i s s o l v e s a l l b y i t s e l f ( 1 9 9 7 , p .
1 7 ) .
A c c o r d i n g t o v a n F r a a s s e n , w i t h i n a u s e c o n c e p t i o n o f l a n g u a g e w e d o
n o t u n d e r s t a n d l a n g u a g e b y o b t a i n i n g a n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f l a n g u a g e ( a n d
P u t n a m ' s m o d e l - t h e o r e t i c a r g u m e n t i s f l a w e d f o r i t s a s s u m p t i o n o f j u s t
t h i s p o i n t ) ; r a t h e r , l a n g u a g e u n d e r s t a n d i n g p r o c e e d s b y m e a n s o f p r a g m a t i c
t a u t o l o g i e s . A s e x a m p l e s o f p r a g m a t i c t a u t o l o g i e s , t h e r e a d e r i s a s k e d t o
c o n s i d e r t h e f o l l o w i n g s e n t e n c e s :
" c a t " d e n o t e s c a t s .
" P a u l i s a c a t " i s t r u e i f a n d o n l y i f P a u l i s a c a t .
( . . . ) t h e f i r s t a n d s e c o n d s e n t e n c e s a r e p a r a d i g m a t i c e x a m p l e s o f p r a g m a t i c t a u t o l o -
g i e s i n m y l a n g u a g e . T h e y a r e u n d e n i a b l e b y m e , e x a c t l y b e c a u s e I a c k n o w l e d g e
" c a t " t o b e a w o r d i n m y l a n g u a g e ( . . . ) I f o u r l a n g u a g e h a d d e v e l o p e d d i f f e r e n t l y i n
a c e r t a i n w a y t h e n " c a t " w o u l d h a v e d e n o t e d g n a t s , r a t s o r b a t s . U n d e r s u c h c i r c u m -
s t a n c e s , u s e s o f " c a t " w o u l d n o t h a v e b e e n a c t s r e f e r r i n g t o c a t s , a n d " P a u l i s a c a t "
w o u l d h a v e b e e n u s e d t o s t a t e t h a t P a u l i s ( n o t a c a t b u t ) a g n a t , r a t , o r b a t . P r a g m a t i c
t a u t o l o g i e s ( f o r m e ) a r e s e n t e n c e s o f m y o w n l a n g u a g e w h i c h s t a t e s o m e t h i n g t h a t
c o u l d i n d e e d b e ( o r c o u l d h a v e b e e n ) f a l s e b u t w h i c h I c a n n o t c o h e r e n t l y d e n y ( p .
3 5 ) .
I n r e l a t i o n t o t h e p r o b l e m o f r e f e r e n c e , t h e n , v a n F r a a s s e n c l a i m s t h a t
t h e s e p r a g m a t i c t a u t o l o g i e s a r e c e n t r a l t o a n e x p l a n a t i o n o f w h y t h e r e i s n o
p r o b l e m o f w h i c h w e c a n s p e a k . H i s a r g u m e n t c a n b e s u m m a r i s e d a s f o l -
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lows. Being able to explain the problem of reference requires that we show
why the predicates of our language have the extensions that they do have,
and not some deviant set of extensions, and this in turn requires that we be
able to state the conditions under which our extensions are the correct ones.
While the demand to establish such conditions has the form of an intelligi-
ble demand, it actually constitutes a type of 'pseudo problem', according
to van Fraassen:
Now, what is the wotry when we worry that this word ["green"] might not have the
right extension? The only answer I can come up with here is:
The worry that there are lots of green things out there which aren't in the exten-
sion of "green" and/or things that are not green yet are in that extension.
But what sense do I make if I say to myself:
There are green things which are not in the extension of "green".
There are some things x such that x is green but "is green" is not rrue of x.
If I say this sort of thing I do not make sense. I may convey through this utter-
ance either that I have no grasp of the philosophical jargon ("extension", "is true
of'), or that I do nor acknowledge the words (e.g. "green") in that sentence as be-
longing to my vocabulary. The worry that there might be green things out there
not denoted by "green" -or cats not denoted by "cat"- is a pseudo problem (1997, p.
36).
It is a pseudo problem more particularly because in order to explain the
conditions under which "cat" denotes cats (a pragmatic tautology) and not,
say, dogs or cars, one must assume a metaphysical standpoint. From within
that standpoint the whole question of what it is for language to refer to the
world appears to be intelligible -rhis question appears to amount to noth-
ing more than an explanation of why we subscribe to certain pragmatic tau-
tologies. Yet such an explanation is unintelligible and necessarily so.
Pragmatic tautologies constitute the referential framework which confers
sense upon such an explanation, indeed, renders such an explanation possi-
ble. By making pragmatic tautologies the subject of this explanation -this
is effectively what we are doing when we attempt to address the question
of what it is for our language to refer to the world- we are at the same time
guaranteeing the unintelligibility of these tautologies.
Now, van Fraassen is claiming that the paradox created by Putnam's
model-theoretic argument stems directly from the conception of language
that is integral to this argument. This conception of language posits a syn-
tax to which we must then add an interpretation. However, the assumption
that we can grasp an interpretation is as unintelligible as the assumption
that we can somehow justify the particular pragmatic tautologies that we
do in fact subscribe to -in both cases, we lack a conceptual perspective
THEORlA - Segunda Epoca 261
Vol. 16/2,2001.237-268
l . o u i s e C U M M I N G S
T H E D I A L E C T I C A L T H I N K I N G O F H I L A R Y P U T N A M
f r o m w h i c h w e c a n p r o c e e d t o g r a s p a n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n a n d j u s t i f y a p r a g -
m a t i c t a u t o l o g y . A s v a n F r a a s s e n r e m a r k s :
T h i s p i c t u r e i s n o n s e n s i c a l , a s c o m e s t o l i g h t a s s o o n a s w e a s k : i n w h a t l a n g u a g e i s
t h i s g r a s p e x p r e s s e d , i n w h a t l a n g u a g e d o w e d e s c r i b e t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n t h a t w e
g r a s p ( p . 3 9 ) .
G i v e n t h a t a p a r t i c u l a r c o n c e p t i o n o f l a n g u a g e i s g e n e r a t i v e o f t h e p a r a -
d o x i c a l c o n c l u s i o n o f P u t n a m ' s m o d e l - t h e o r e t i c a r g u m e n t , i r i s t h i s c o n -
c e p t i o n , v a n F r a a s s e n c l a i m s , w h i c h w e m u s t d i s p e n s e w i t h . Y e t , v a n F r a a s -
s e n ' s o b j e c t i o n s t o t h e c o n t r a r y n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g , t h i s i s e f f e c t i v e l y w h a t
P u t n a m i s a l s o c l a i m i n g ! " . T h e v e r y r e a s o n w h y " P u r n a m w o u l d a p p e a l t o
[ t h i s c o n c e p t i o n o f l a n g u a g e i n 1 9 7 6 ] i m p l i c i t l y a n d e x p e c t h i s a u d i e n c e t o
g o a l o n g " ( p . 2 3 ) i s t h a t t h i s i s t h e o n l y c o n c e p t i o n o f l a n g u a g e w h i c h i s
c o n s i s t e n t w i t h a m e t a p h y s i c a l r e a l i s t v i e w p o i n t . I n r e j e c t i n g m e t a p h y s i c a l
r e a l i s m , P u t n a m i s , i n e f f e c t , r e j e c t i n g t h e c o n c e p t i o n o f l a n g u a g e t h a t i s
m o t i v a t e d b y m e t a p h y s i c a l r e a l i s m , a c o n c e p t i o n i n w h i c h l a n g u a g e c o n -
s i s t s i n a n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n a n d a s e p a r a t e l y i d e n t i f i a b l e s y n t a x ( w r i t i n g , a s h e
i s , i n 1 9 9 7 , v a n F r a a s s e n s h o u l d b e a w a r e o f t h i s , g i v e n P u t n a m ' s e a r l i e r
c r i t i c i s m s o f t h e i n t e r f a c e c o n c e p t i o n o f b o t h p e r c e p t i o n a n d c o n c e p t i o n ) .
I t t h u s e m e r g e s t h a t v a n F r a a s s e n a n d P u t n a r n a r e b o t h e q u a l l y o p p o s e d t o
t h e s a m e c o n c e p t i o n o f l a n g u a g e , a n i n t e r f a c e c o n c e p t i o n , a n d t h a t t h e i r
v i e w s o n t h e u p s h o t o f t h e m o d e l - t h e o r e t i c a r g u m e n t c o n v e r g e r a t h e r t h a n ,
a s v a n F r a a s s e n i s c l a i m i n g , d i v e r g e ( T h e v a r i o u s s t a g e s o f P u t n a r n ' s d i a l e c -
t i c a l e x a m i n a t i o n o f m e t a p h y s i c a l r e a l i s m a r e s u m m a r i s e d i n F i g u r e 2 ) .
I n t h i s p a p e r , I h a v e e x a m i n e d t h e e v o l u t i o n o f a t y p e o f d i a l e c t i c a l
t h i n k i n g ( c r i t i c i s m ) i n t h e p h i l o s o p h y o f H i l a r y P u m a m . T h i s e x a m i n a t i o n
h a s t a k e n t h e f o r m o f a d e t a i l e d a n a l y s i s o f t h i s t h i n k i n g , a s i t i s m a n i -
f e s t e d i n P u t n a r n ' s d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e f a c t / v a l u e d i c h o t o m y a n d m e t a p h y s i -
c a l r e a l i s m . T h e s e a r e a s d o n o t s i m p l y r e p r e s e n t P u t n a m ' s p r e s e n t - d a y
p h i l o s o p h i c a l c o n c e r n s , b u t t h e y s p a n , i n e f f e c t , m a n y y e a r s o f p h i l o s o p h i -
c a l r e f l e c t i o n f o r P u r n a m . I t i s t h e i r p e r p e t u a l e m e r g e n c e i n t h i s r e f l e c t i o n
w h i c h r e n d e r s t h e m s u i t a b l e s c e n a r i o s f o r s t u d y , w h e n t h a t s t u d y i s o f a
t y p e o f d i a l e c t i c a l t h i n k i n g w h i c h h a s u n d e r g o n e , I a m c l a i m i n g , i t s o w n
d e v e l o p m e n t a s p a r t o f t h i s r e f l e c t i o n . I n d e e d , i t i s o n l y i n P u t n a m ' s m o r e
r e c e n t w o r k t h a t t h i s d i a l e c t i c h a s a c h i e v e d i t s m o s t d e v e l o p e d ( a n d m o s t
e x p l i c i t ) f o r m , a f o r m w h i c h , I h a v e b e e n a r g u i n g , c o n s i s t s i n c r i t i c i s m a n d
e x p o s u r e o f u n i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y i n p h i l o s o p h y .
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L o u i s e C U M M I N G S
N o t e s
T H E D I A L EC T I C A L T H I N K I N G O F H I L A R Y P U T N A M
t T h i s p a p e r w a s w r i t t e n w h i l e t h e a u t h o r w a s a V i s i t i n g F e l l o w a f f i l i a t e d w i t h t h e D e -
p a r t m e n t o f P h i l o s o p h y a t H a r v a r d U n i v e r s i t y . T h e a u t h o r w i s h e s t o a c k n o w l e d g e h e r
i n d e b t e d n e s s t o H i l a r y P u t n a r n , H a r v a r d U n i v e r s i t y , f o r d i s c u s s i o n o f a n u m b e r o f t h e
i s s u e s a d d r e s s e d i n t h i s p a p e r a n d t o t w o r e f e r e e s o f t h i s j o u r n a l f o r t h e i r c o m m e n t s o n
a n e a r l i e r v e r s i o n o f t h i s p a p e r .
I T h e d i a l e c t i c a l c h a r a c t e r o f P u m a r n ' s w o r k h a s b e e n c o m m e n t e d u p o n b y J a m e s C o n a n r
i n h i s i n t r o d u c t i o n t o W o r d s a n d L i f e ( P u r n a r n , 1 9 9 4 a ) : " S o m e o f t h e m [ P u r n a r n ' s e s -
s a y s ] b e g i n w i t h a d i a l e c t i c a l o v e r v i e w o f a p h i l o s o p h i c a l c o n t r o v e r s y ( o f t e n i n o r d e r
t o t r y t o b r i n g o u r h o w t h e c r u c i a l p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s a r e o n e s w h i c h b o t h p a r t i e s t o t h e
d i s p u t e s h a r e ) . T h e p r o x i m a t e g o a l o f t h e s e e s s a y s t h e r e f o r e i s n o t t o a t t e m p t t o h a v e t h e
l a s t w o r d a b o u t a p h i l o s o p h i c a l p r o b l e m , b u t r a t h e r t o g i v e t h e r e a d e r a s e n s e o f t h e
s h a p e a n d t h e d e p t h o f t h e p r o b l e m - o f h o w , f o r e x a m p l e , i n a p a r t i c u l a r p h i l o s o p h i -
c a l d i s p u t e , t h e s i s a n d c o u n t e r - t h e s i s b e a r o n e a n o t h e r ' s s t a m p a n d h o w e a c h o f t h e p a i r
c o m e s w i t h i t s o w n f a l s e b o t t o m , h i d i n g t h e t r u e d i m e n s i o n s o f t h e p r o b l e m Fr o m
v i e w " ( p . x i i i ) .
2 T h e o b j e c t i v e - s u b j e c t i v e a n d f a c t - v a l u e d i c h o t o m i e s a r e e v i d e n t i n d i s c u s s i o n s i n I i n -
g u i s t i c s : " M o s t l i s t e n e r s k n o w o f l i n g u i s t i c v a r i e t i e s t h a t t h e y d o n o t l i k e , b u r w e
s h o u l d r e c o g n i s e t h a t t h e s e f e e l i n g s a r e v e r y s u b j e c t i v e a n d h a v e n o b a s i s i n o b j e c t i v e l i n -
g u i s t i c f a c t " ( T r u d g i l l 1 9 8 3 , p . 2 2 4 , e m p h a s e s a d d e d ) . A g a i n : " W e a l s o w a n t t o s u g g e s t
t h a t l i n g u i s t s s h o u l d , i n a d d i t i o n , r e s i s t v a l u e j u d g e m e n t s a b o u t l a n g u a g e o n o t h e r
c o u n t s , n o t a b l y t h a t o f t h e ' i n a d e q u a c y ' o f c e r t a i n l a n g u a g e v a r i e t i e s , a n d t h a t o f t h e i n -
f e r i o r ' a e s t h e t i c ' q u a l i t y o f c e r t a i n t y p e s o f s p e e c h , s i n c e j u d g e m e n t s o f t h i s t y p e a r e
a l s o i m p o r t a n t i n t h e e d u c a t i o n a l f i e l d " ( p , 2 0 I , e m p h a s i s a d d e d ) .
3 T h e p a r t o f t h e a r g u m e n t w h i c h I w i l l n o t e x a m i n e i n v o l v e s a c o m p a r i s o n o f t h e v a l u e s
p r e s u p p o s e d b y s c i e n c e w i t h ' p a r a d i g m a t i c v a l u e w o r d s ' . T h e c o m p a r i s o n i n c l u d e s t h e
f o l l o w i n g f a c t o r s . B o t h g r o u p s o f v a l u e s ( I ) a r e u s e d a s t e r m s o f p r a i s e , ( 2 ) a r e h i s r o r i -
c a l l y c o n d i t i o n e d , ( 3 ) " f i g u r e i n t h e s a m e s o r t s o f p e r e n n i a l p h i l o s o p h i c a l c o n t r o v e r -
s i e s " ( p . 1 3 6 ) a n d ( 4 ) a r e e q u a l l y d i f f i c u l t t o j u s t i f y : " T h e q u e s t i o n : w h i c h i s t h e r a -
t i o n a l c o n c e p t i o n o f r a t i o n a l i t y i t s e l f i s d i f f i c u l t i n e x a c t l y t h e w a y t h a t t h e j u s t i f i c a t i o n
o f a n e t h i c a l s y s t e m i s d i f f i c u l r . T h e r e i s n o n e u t r a l c o n c e p t i o n o f r a t i o n a l i t y t o
w h i c h t o a p p e a l . " ( p . 1 3 6 , e m p h a s e s i n o r i g i n a l ) . I n t h i s w a y , P u r n a r n ' s a r g u m e n t f o r
t h e f u z z i n e s s o f t h e d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n f a c t a n d v a l u e p r o c e e d s b y f i r s t i d e n t i f y i n g
t h e v a l u e s w h i c h a r e p r e s u p p o s e d b y s c i e n t i f i c i n q u i r y a n d t h e n b y d e m o n s t r a t i n g h o w
t h e s e v a l u e s a r e s i m i l a r , i n e s s e n t i a l r e s p e c t s , t o p a r a d i g m a t i c v a l u e t e r m s .
4 M y e r s o n ( 1 9 9 4 ) s u m m a r i s e s t h i s p o i n t a s f o l l o w s : " I n s u m , t h e f a c t o f k n o w i n g a b o u t
t h e i l l u s i o n f a l s i f i e s t h e t h e o r y ! " ( p . 9 2 ) . H o w t h i s p a r t i c u l a r c o n s i d e r a t i o n r e l a t e s t o
P u r n a m ' s c h a r g e o f s e l f - r e f u t a t i o n a g a i n s t t h e v a r i s r w i l l b e e x a m i n e d s u b s e q u e n t l y i n
t h e t e x t .
5 T h e e v i l s c i e n t i s t i n P u t n a m ' s b r a i n i n a v a t s c e n a r i o c o n t r o l s c o m p u t e r i m p u l s e s t o t h e
v a r i s t f r o m a p o s i t i o n o u t s i d e t h e v a t .
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V o l . 1 6 /2 , 2 0 0 1 , 2 3 7 - 2 6 8
Louise CUMMINGS THE DIALECTICAL THINKING OF HILARY PUTNAM
GPurnarn signals the absence of a rational route to knowledge through his emphasis In
"Oh, the Guru of Sydney just lenotus' (1981 , p. 131) .
7 Of course, the vatisr may choose to concede the absence of rational discourse, a move
which restores consistency to his account -in such a case, sayingand thinking and the no-
tion of reftrence that these practices presuppose could nor enter into a charge of se! f-
refutation against the varisr. However, nor only does the proponent of the brains-in-a-
vat thesis engage in a number of rational activities which involve this thesis
(argument. expl anation. ctc.), but it was argued in the main text that a move of this
kind would serve only to preclude any and all discussion of the vatisr's position and, in
the final analysis, would serve to bring about the dissolution of that position. It seems
unproblcmaric to suggest that the vatisr would find these particular outcomes unac-
ceptable.
8 There are two components to this line of thinking -(1) rationality (represented here by
an epistemological standpoint) is presupposed by the varist's reflective practice and (2)
the rarionaliry of this standpoint cannot be identified with the rational discourse sub-
sumed by the vatisr's illusion .
9 Logical symbolism assumes a dialectical role -rhe dissolution of nonsense- for Wirrgen-
stein and Frege: "Wittgenstein continues to share with Frege the idea that a well-
regimented logical symbolism provides a notation for perspicuously displaying in-
ferential relations , th ereby providing a window onto the logical structure of our lan-
guage and furnishing a dialectical tool for dissolving philosophical confusion"
(Conant, 1991 , p. 141) .
ID Under 'cognitive scient ists' I include reducrionist researchers in the fields of artificial
intelligence, cognitive psychology and linguistics .
I I Proponents of reducri oni sr an alysis typically explain intentionality using a range 0 f
scientific languages in addition to that of ph ysics: "Reducrionisrn, with respect to a
class of assertions (e.g, assertions about mental events) is the view that assertions in that
class are 'made true' by facts wh ich are outside of that class" (Purnam 1981, p. 56). An
example frequently d iscussed in thi s regard is one in which thoughts are 'made true'
(given content) by phys ical facts. "For another example, the view of Bishop Berkeley
that all there 'really is' is minds and their sensat ions is reductionist, for it holds that
sentences about tables and cha irs and other ordinary 'material objects' are actually
made true by facts about sensations" (1981, p. 56; emphasis in original). A third form
of reductionist ana lysis, th is time relating not to truth but to rationality, is that 0 f
cultural relati vism" (00 ') the cultural relativist's paradigm is a soft science: anthropol-
ogy , or linguist ics, o r psychology, or history, as the case may be. That reason is what-
ever the norms of the local culture determine it to be is a reducrionist view in spired
by the socialsciences, includ ing history" (Purnarn 1983, p. 235; emphases in original) .
12 A different tendency is exemp lified by the e1iminativist views of thinkers like Rich-
ard Rorry, Paul and Patricia Churchland, Srephen Stich and, to some degree, W.Y.
Quine. Rorry, like Putnarn, reject s the central tenet of metaphysical realism, that our
mental representations are in correspondence with a mind-independent reality. How-
ever, the failure of metaphysical realism holds a fundamentally different signifi-
cance for these two wr iters . Purnam's response is to question the dualism behind the
metaphysical realist picture, whereas for Rorry the very notion of representation
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T H E D I A L E C T I C A L T H I N K I N G O F H I L A R Y P U T N A M
s h o u l d b e a b a n d o n e d : " ( . . . ) h i s [ R o r r y ' s ] e n t i r e a t t a c k o n t r a d i t i o n a l p h i l o s o p h y i s
m o u n t e d o n t h e b a s i s t h a t t h e n a t u r e o f r e a s o n a n d r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a r e n o n - p r o b l e m s , b e -
c a u s e t h e o n l y k i n d o f t r u t h i t m a k e s s e n s e t o s e e k i s t o c o n v i n c e o n e ' s c u l t u r a l p e e r s "
( P u t n a r n 1 9 8 3 , p . 2 3 5 ) . I n f a c t , R o r r y h a s m o v e d f r o m a r e l a t i v i s t t o a d c c o n s t r u c t i o n i s r
p o s i t i o n .
1 3 I n p r o p o s i n g a r e t u r n t o a n A r i s t o t e l i a n c o n c e p t i o n o f t h e m i n d a n d i t s r e l a t i o n s h i p t o
t h e w o r l d , N u s s b a u m a n d P u r n a r n , i n ' C h a n g i n g A r i s t o t l e ' s M i n d ' ( W o r d r a n d L i f t ) ,
r e j e c t t h a t t h e r e i s a n y ' p r o b l e m ' t o w h i c h w e m u s t f i n d a ' s o l u t i o n ' : " A s A r i s t o r e l i a n s
w e d o n o r d i s c o v e r s o m e t h i n g b e h i n d s o m e t h i n g e l s e , a h i d d e n r e a l i t y b e h i n d t h e
c o m p l e x u n i t y t h a t w e s e e a n d a r e . W e f i n d w h a t w e a r e i n t h e a p p e a r a n c e s . A n d A r i s -
t o t l e t e l l s u s t h a t i f w e a t t e n d p r o p e r l y t o t h e a p p e a r a n c e s t h e d u a l i s t ' s q u e s t i o n s n e v e r
e v e n g e t g o i n g " ( 1 9 9 4 a , p . 5 5 ) .
1 4 F o r P u r n a m , t h e m e t a p h y s i c a l r e a l i s t " a s s u m e s t h a t t h e r e i s a n i n t e l l i g i b l e d i s t i n c t i o n
w i t h i n o u r c o n c e p t u a l s y s t e m b e t w e e n w h a t i t i s p o s s i b l e t o c o n c e i v e o f w i t h i n t h a t s y s -
t e m a n d w h a t i s r e a l l y ( i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f a l l c o n c e p t u a l s y s t e m s ) t h e c a s e " ( 1 9 8 3 , p .
I l l ) ; " T h e d e e p s y s t e m i c r o o t o f t h e d i s e a s e [ o f w h i c h s e n s e d a t a a r e a s y m p t o m ] , I w a n t
t o s u g g e s t , l i e s i n t h e n o t i o n o f a n ' i n t r i n s i c ' p r o p e r t y , a p r o p e r t y s o m e t h i n g h a s ' i n i t -
s e l f , a p a r t f r o m a n y c o n t r i b u t i o n m a d e b y l a n g u a g e o r t h e m i n d " ( 1 9 8 7 , p . 8 ) .
1 5 P u t n a r n d e s c r i b e s h o w o t h e r w r i t e r s h a v e r e l i n q u i s h e d a m e t a p h y s i c a l s t a n d p o i n t ( r h e
s p e c t a t o r p o i n t o f v i e w i n m e t a p h y s i c s a n d e p i s t e m o l o g y ' ) i n f a v o u r o f a p i c t u r e w h i c h
e m p h a s i s e s t h e s i g n i f i c a n c e o f o u r v a r i o u s p r a c t i c e s : " L i k e t h e g r e a t p r a g m a t i s t s , t h e s e
t h i n k e r s [ D a v i d s o n , G o o d m a n a n d Q u i n e ] h a v e u r g e d u s t o r e j e c t t h e s p e c t a t o r p o i n t o f
v i e w i n m e t a p h y s i c s a n d e p i s t e m o l o g y . Q u i n e h a s u r g e d u s t o a c c e p t t h e e x i s t e n c e 0 f
a b s t r a c t e n t i t i e s o n t h e g r o u n d t h a t t h e s e a r e i n d i s p e n s i b l e i n m a t h e m a t i c s , a n d o f m i -
c r o p a r r i c l c s a n d s p a c e - t i m e p o i n t s o n t h e g r o u n d t h a t t h e s e a r c i n d i s p e n s i b l c i n p h y s -
i c s ; a n d w h a t b e t t e r j u s t i f i c a t i o n i s t h e r e f o r a c c e p t i n g a n o n c o l o g y t h a n i t s i n d i s p e n -
s i b i l i r y i n o u r s c i e n t i f i c p r a c t i c e ? h e a s k s . G o o d m a n h a s u r g e d u s t o t a k e s e r i o u s l y t h e
m e t a p h o r s t h a t a r t i s t s u s e t o r e s t r u c t u r e o u r w o r l d s , o n t h e g r o u n d t h a t t h e s e a r e a n i n -
d i s p e n s i b l e w a y o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g o u r e x p e r i e n c e . D a v i d s o n h a s r e j e c t e d t h e i d e a t h a t
t a l k o f p r e p o s i t i o n a l a r t i t u d e s i s ' s e c o n d c l a s s ' , o n s i m i l a r g r o u n d s " ( 1 9 8 7 , p p . 2 0 - 2 1 ) .
1 6 O n t h i s a c c o u n t , a f u l l y d e v e l o p e d p h i l o s o p h i c a l v i e w i s n o n e o t h e r t h a n a p h i l o s o p h i -
c a l t h e o r y w h i c h i s , i n t u r n , t h e m a n i f e s t a t i o n o f m e t a p h y s i c s i n p h i l o s o p h y .
1 7 " T h e m e t a p h y s i c a l r e a l i s t ( . . . ) f e e l s c o m p e l l e d t o a p p e a l t o s o m e t h i n g t h a t u n d e r l i e s
o u r l a n g u a g e g a m e s : a m y s t e r i o u s p r o p e r r y t h a t s t a n d s b e h i n d - b o r h i n t h e s e n s e o f r e -
m a i n i n g i n v i s i b l y i n t h e b a c k g r o u n d a n d i n t h e s e n s e o f g u a r a n t e e i n g - o u r o r d i n a r y
w a y s o f s p e a k i n g a n d a c t i n g " ( P u r n a r n 1 9 9 4 b . p . 5 0 0 ) .
1 8 V a n F r a a s s e n d e f i n e s t h a t c o n c e p t i o n o f l a n g u a g e a s o n e i n w h i c h " t o u n d e r s t a n d o r h a v e
a l a n g u a g e i s t o k n o w i t s s y n t a x a n d t o g r a s p a n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f t h a t s y n t a x " ( 1 9 9 7 , p .
3 9 ) .
1 9 I n f a i r n e s s t o v a n F r a a s s e n , h e d o e s a t l e a s t h i n t a t t h e p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t P u r n a m i s m a k i n g
a s i m i l a r c l a i m t o h i s o w n : " O n m y r e a d i n g o f P u r n a r n ' s m o d e l - t h e o r e t i c a r g u m e n c ,
t h e p a r a d o x d i s s o l v e s . W h a t r e m a i n s i s a s t r i k i n g r e d u c t i o o f a c e r t a i n v i e w o f l a n -
g u a g e , w h i c h w e c a n i n d e p e n d e n t l y v e r i f y t o b e i n a d e q u a t e . P e r h a p s t h a t w a s j u s t w h a t
P u t n a r n i n t e n d e d ; p e r h a p s t h e v i e w o f l a n g u a g e f o u n d w a n t i n g i s i m p l i e d b y t h a t c o r -
r e s p o n d e n c e t h e o r y o f t r u t h w h i c h P u t n a m l o c a t e s a t t h e h e a r t o f m e t a p h y s i c a l r e a l i s m .
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I would like to think so; but authorial intent is notoriously indiscern ible; the text has
broken its moorings and must in any case be dealt with on its own terms" (1997. p. 34) .
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L o u i s e C U M M I N G S
T H E D I A L E C T I C A L T H I N K I N G O F H I L A R Y P U T N A M
L o u i s e C u m m i n g s p u r s u e s w i t h i n h e r r e s e a r c h a n e x a m i n a t i o n o f t h e a p p l i -
c a t i o n s o f H i l a r y P u t n a m ' s p h i l o s o p h y t o t h e o r e t i c a l f r a m e w o r k s i n b o t h
p h i l o s o p h i c a l a n d n o n - p h i l o s o p h i c a l ( p r i m a r i l y l i n g u i s t i c ) a r e a s o f i n -
q u i r y . T h i s i s r e f l e c t e d i n p u b l i c a t i o n s i n t h e J o u r n a l o f P r a g m a t i c s , w h e r e
a P u t n a r n - i n f o r r n e d c h a l l e n g e t o t h e r e d u c r i o n i s r n o f S p e r b e r a n d W i l s o n ' s
( 1 9 9 5 , 1 9 8 6 ) r e l e v a n c e t h e o r y i s m o u n t e d . a n d i n I n f o r m a l L o g i c a n d P h i l o -
s o p h i c a l P a p e r s . w h e r e P u r n a m ' s t h i n k i n g i n f o r m s t h e a n a l y s i s o f a n i n f o r -
m a l f a l l a c y , t h a t o f p e t i t i o p r i n c i p i i .
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